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The Arab Uprising—Comparing Jasmine’s success to Rage’s failure 
The Arab Uprising has been an issue of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since the late 
2010, when its spark got ignited in Tunisia. The domino effect spread in the region dragging 
countries into a state of restlessness and confusion. The thesis follows a comparative approach 
in which two outstanding countries in the region are compared: Tunisia as the initiator of the 
spark and the leader country in its path to democratization, and Egypt as a powerful Arab 
country which, despite not falling into civil war, was still being dragged in the mud of 
authoritarianism. Two major factors that contributed to the process of events taking place in the 
two countries were the military and Islamic parties. The military had its effect on the revolution 
while siding with or against the benefit of the nation; the Islamic parties of stronger presence 
in the country also had their effect on the process of events in either opening or not opening the 
path for dialogue and secular development in the country. Both agents with their inherited 
perspectives and ideologies on the way of ruling led each of the mentioned countries to its own 
different path. Luckily, with the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia was given the chance to tear away 
from the dictatorship; but unluckily for Egypt, the circumstances surrounding Rage Revolution 
pushed the country further into the claws of authoritarianism.   
 




Arabska vstaja—primerjava uspeha Jasmina z neuspehom Jeze 
V Tuniziji so proti koncu 2010 zanetili iskro Arabske vstaje in njen ogenj se je razširil po celotni 
regiji in postal problem severne Afrike in Bližnjega vzhoda. Domino efekt je pahnil dežele v 
razmere zmede in nemirov. Teza se poslužuje metode primerjalnega pristopa tekom katere 
primerjam dve vidni državi v regiji. Tunizija, kjer se je iskra upora prižgala, je stopala naprej 
po poti demokratizacije.Na drugi strani je Egipt, močna arabska država, kljub temu da ni bil 
potegnjen v državljansko vojno, zabredel v blato avtoritarizma. Dva bistvena akterja, ki sta 
vplivala na razvoj dogodkov v obeh državah sta bila vojska in Islamske stranke.Vojska je 
usmerjala tok vstaje tako, da se je postavila v bran ali pa proti koristim ljudstva.V deželah 
močno prisotne Islamske stranke so vplivale na dogodke tako, da so odprle pot dijaloga in 
možnosti sekularnega razvoja ali pa ne. Oba akterja, s svojimi podedovanimi predstavami o 
prihodnosti in idejologijami kako vladati, sta vodila vsako od omenjenih držav po njeni lastni 
drugačni poti. K sreči je Tunizija s svojo Revolucijo jasmina dobila možnost, da se odtrga od 
diktature. Na drugi strani so okoliščine, ki so na žalost obdajale egiptovsko Revolucijo jeze, 
potisnile deželo v kremplje avtoritarizma. 
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Very little has been written, and is thus understood, about why Tunisia, the country that gave 
birth to the Arab Spring, has been the only democracy to emerge from it. ‘Why Tunisia?’ is a 
question that resonates among Arabs yearning for similar democratic outcomes and wondering 
why such freedoms remain out of their reach. (…). Egypt takes the prize when it comes to a 
revolution that dashed democratic hopes almost as quickly as it had created them. Twice, 
‘democratic’ methods were used to bring down democracy—first by the Muslim Brotherhood 
and then by the military (p. xxv). 
With the previous quote taken from the book entitled Tunisia: An Arab anomaly (2017), 
Professor Safwan Masri summarizes the story of the two countries—Tunisia and Egypt. Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) has always been the region of precious treasures to the world. 
MENA has attracted the West with its attractive geographic positon and the black gold in 
presence, and the West has always found ways to keep its presence in the region. MENA has 
been more like a cake shared among the domineering nations of the world, each of them taking 
the piece that they perceived as sweeter. It is therefore unfortunate for MENA to be in the center 
of a world where the region has power over major international straits that the world is 
dependent on. This cake was not only divided among Western countries, but it was forced to 
deal with a greater pressure of foreign countries’ interference when a new government was 
announced in the region, Israel. A major reason for the conflict in MENA was caused by Israel 
having the West as its protector. For Israeli benefits, a lot of the Arab pride was diminished in 
the process of keeping friendly foreign relations while trying to keep Israel safe.  
Although MENA was given its independence, Western colonizers never planned to set their 
previously colonized countries free. The plan was always to keep a hand on the treasures there. 
They had to tie themselves to the region by all means. A perfect way to do so was by setting 
figures with a military background, who the West controlled like puppets, to the leading 
positons, while providing military financial aids to their countries so that they would be able to 
increase their military protection. It was a strategy of alliance that put MENA in the hands of 
the West.  
Despite a long era of authoritarian regime control and the nation’s fear of objection, the time 
finally came when history books opened a new chapter for the region, the Arab Uprising. It all 
started in late 2010 when a vendor set himself to fire as a consequence of poverty, humiliation, 
injustice and degradation which he could no longer take, in what was then called free Tunisia. 
A man martyred himself out of despair and his action echoed in the nation and later in the 
region. Tunisia marked the starting point for a historic change and proved change, although not 
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easy, was still possible. The other countries that followed were less fortunate on the issue. 
Although they tried to follow the Tunisian path, they were mostly dragged into a more severe 
form of authoritarianism, restlessness, insecurity, war, killing and torture. Why? 
“Why, when the other countries that had joined Tunisia in shaking off tyranny collapsed into 
civil war or renewed military rule, did Tunisia itself seem to manage to reform its state 
institutions, to resort to debate and dialogue—often heated but very rarely violent—to air 
difference and come to compromise” (Masri, 2017, pp. xiv-xv).   
Has the so-called democratic West had a lack of interest for spreading democracy in MENA? 
Has the West favored restlessness in the region so that western weaponry industry kept 
profiting? Isn’t it enough that no Arab Unity has ever been achieved, hence bringing the region 
to fragmentation and thus weakening its power? It seems that these Western plans have not 
been enough. To the West, civil war and unrest have been of greater interest in the region. 
Unfortunately, not all that has been planned has taken the direction intended even when these 
plans have been made by superpowers. By triggering war in the region, the West has not paid 
much attention to the rise of terrorism which has later targeted the West itself. As a 
consequence, changes in Western tactics had to be followed and wise decisions were to be 
promptly taken.  
With the fall of MENA into the abyss, two major countries came to prominence for discussion: 
Tunisia and Egypt. The choice is simple to explain. Tunisia: An Arab anomaly, as Safwan Masri 
titled his book, is the only country in MENA different than the rest in its heading towards 
democratization. The choice for Egypt, on the other hand, comes from its leading power and 
role in the region, in addition to its path to further authoritarianism which made it extremely 
different from the Tunisian path. Both countries shared two major points that could be 
compared as to understand the results reached upon—the military and its role in supporting or 
suppressing the revolution, and the major Islamic parties that came to power after decades of 
oppression. It was the decisions these actors made in either siding with the nation or looking 
after their own benefits that deviated the two paths from each other.   
The thesis is the story of “what became known as the Arab Spring (…) the ‘Arab Awakening,’ 





1.1 Research Goals 
The Middle East has been a region of significant importance to the world. Its location and 
natural wealth has made it a point of attraction to foreign interference, which in effect 
contributed to different political situations of the Arab countries. Despite the uniqueness of each 
country, the Arab world has long been characterized by the prevalence of a dictatorship ever 
since the countries gained independence from their colonizers. The countries have different 
effects on different world countries, and some of them have economic, peacekeeping and 
counterterrorism relations. In addition, the political change in Arab countries has a certain 
impact on the relations and stability of the countries outside the region. Thus, political changes 
in the area have always taken place with observable reasons. 
The dramatic change that the region has gone through is manifested in the uprising and 
revolutions by the end of 2010, when it all started with Tunisia and spread through the region 
as a “domino effect that became known as the Arab Spring” (Masri, 2017, p. vvx). Egypt, Libya, 
Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, to mention a few, have been trying to achieve what Jasmine 
Revolution in Tunisia has—democracy, but they have not had the same fortune, and they 
deviated into persistent authoritarianism. 
The research gets its importance from the concept of achieving democratization, especially in 
MENA which seems prone and resistant to (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 374). Hence, a better 
understanding can be obtained by looking at the authoritarian regimes with the support of 
military in the region. Military responses to revolutions have played essential roles on the 
outcomes. Tunisian military acted professionally, protecting its people from the authoritarian 
regime; on the contrary, the Egyptian one kept its authoritarian power in politics and economics 
(Demir, 2016, pp. 36-42). Needless to mention, foreign countries had even more influence on 
the military, which gave even more power to the concept of praetorianism and authoritarianism. 
Though seeming same to an outsider, giving it a closer look can help an observer notice the 
difference in the Islamic parties involved in a country. While both having Islamic base, the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia have actually had some very 
different influence on the events taking place in their respective regions, as each has had a 
different approach in dealing with the situation their country has undergone, and as a result the 





The research focuses on two hypotheses: 
- The first hypothesis: The military has a major role that has influenced Egypt and Tunisia 
differently and has enabled one, but not the other, to pass to democracy through each military’s 
internal ideology, in addition to the support each has got from other countries. 
- The second hypothesis: Major Islamic parties that have come to power in Egypt and Tunisia 
have had influence in bringing one of the countries to the shore of democracy, while dragging 
the other back to the dark ages of military and dictatorship. 
The two hypotheses are being studied in different chapters through the thesis. Chapter 3 clarifies 
concepts of authoritarianism and democratization, which are the outcomes the hypotheses 
target. Both hypotheses’ aim is to prove how certain factors lead to authoritarianism and 
dictatorship, while other factors lead to democratization and freedom. More specifically, both 
concepts are defined in terms of MENA, as countries of the region have certain reasons in 
common that lead to authoritarianism and diminish prospects of democratization. 
Chapter 4 narrates the starting stage of the revolution and shows the role of military as the first 
actor that had influenced the process of the events that followed, as stated by the first 
hypothesis.  
The following chapter, Chapter 5, fully discusses the role of the military in each of the two 
countries. The first hypothesis is discussed in the chapter by first stressing the theories that 
shape the military’s functional role in a country. Military role in a country differs according to 
the ideology and role it is given. Later in the same chapter, the two different roles the Egyptian 
and Tunisian military had are clarified. The ideology of the rather non-professional role of the 
Egyptian army helped authoritarianism to prevail, while the more professional military of 
Tunisia led to the starting stage of democratization. Through the chapter, explanation will be 
given on the factors in relation to the military that contributed to the outcomes of 
democratization and authoritarianism.  
The second hypothesis is explained in chapter 6, where an explanation is given in regard to the 
Islamic parties involved in the process of revolutionary success. The Egyptian Brotherhood 
contributed to the failure of the revolution by the inexperience of the process that was followed; 
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on the other hand, Tunisian Ennahda proved its modern and moderate concept of civilized 
approach to open dialogue that diminished the chances of dictatorship. 
Chapter 7 provides the results obtained from the hypotheses stated in the previous chapters. A 























2 RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
In the research two research designs are conducted. The first methodology followed is the 
qualitative approach, because a small number of cases are being researched; in the research 
only two cases are discussed: Tunisia and Egypt. As such, an in-depth research design is 
followed in which each case is looked at separately and then the two cases are compared to each 
other. 
The other research method used is the comparative method in which similarities and differences 
are outlined. It is a method which makes the researcher go into the comparison of the details 
obtained from each of the cases. 
 
2.1 Qualitative Research Design 
When it comes to addressing substantive enquiries, the qualitative research design is the 
appropriate method of research to follow. As for the field of political science, researchers use 
the qualitative method of research design to connect cases together. While studying the cases 
and comparing them to each other, new theories and explanations come out of such qualitative 
studies (Mahoney, 2007, p. 125). This makes the qualitative study different from the statistical 
one, in which the latter only “systematically compare[s] aspects of cases”, leaving no space for 
new discoveries. In other words, unless the statistical methodology uses the qualitative method 
of research by which it may search for new variables, the statistical method may not become 
familiar with any new variable that would lead to new theories. The qualitative design is 
essential in political studies and comparative politics as it enables the flow of research to be 
carried out through a span of time in which new variables might be added to the research and 
related to new outcomes (Mahoney, 2007, p. 126). 
With qualitative research, measurement errors are also avoided. When full understanding is 
given on a particular case because of the presence of qualitative research, measurement of a 
study is given further accuracy. Thus, meanings to certain indicators in a case are given through 
the comparative study. With the in-depth study of qualitative research, fewer mistakes might 




Qualitative research designs search for facts and knowledge about a case to get to certain results, 
though not all facts might be of same effect and contribution to the results expected. Moreover, 
every theory given is open to chances of being falsified for which chances are very small. To 
give a certain hypothesis more credibility, the qualitative research opens the space for “within-
case analysis”. Here, sub-hypotheses might be included to the study to prove its accuracy 
(Mahoney, 2007, p. 132). 
The hypotheses presented is analyzed in accordance with the qualitative method design. The 
paper covers two countries for which each is given an in-depth study. Moreover, the two 
hypotheses presented are given detailed analysis in which sub-hypotheses are included. The 
qualitative research design allows the coverage of a long span of time where variables change 
leading to outcomes that are to be proved even with the changes of events that took place over 
that amount of time. The qualitative research design is also an essential part of the comparative 
research design which is also used in the paper. The two designs are correlated and thus used 
simultaneously.  
 
2.2 Comparative Research Design 
Any empirical social science research is difficult to be done without following the comparative 
methodology. Certain cases are compared to each other depending on certain variables that in 
the end lead to certain outcomes and conclusions (Ragin, 1987, p. 1). Comparativists are usually 
interested in certain outcomes, and so in order to reach the results they target, they need to find 
cases with historic sequences that are similar or different in accordance to the results aimed to 
be proven. As historical outcomes are complicated and need a combination of explanations, the 
explanation of such cases are best to be done following the qualitative approach rather than the 
quantitative one. Hence, it is the number of variables of small number of cases that best leads 
to the outcome of a research, rather than a large number of cases (Ragin, 1987, p. 13). The 
comparative method uses logic; it combines the method of agreement and the method of 
difference. Hence, comparativists collect the conditions available and compare and contrast 
them to reach the results desired (outcomes). Due to the type of comparative approach, statistics 
are of less importance in the work. Here “relevant instances of the phenomenon of interest” are 
important to the researcher, and he deals with them in terms of possibility and not probability. 
For the researcher, certain variables might lead to certain outcomes. It is never the case that 
variables must lead to certain outcomes. A researcher might as well come to the conclusion that 
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two types of combinations lead to same results which the researcher does not ignore but apply 
in theory with equal significance (Ragin, 1987, p. 15). A researcher uses the method by 
choosing separate cases and going into each one’s details and then comparing the cases to come 
to a conclusion on similarities and differences. Thus, some explanations can be given on every 
phenomenon even when a case deviates from the regularity which gives the method its 
superiority (Ragin, 1987, p. 16). Comparative methodology depends a lot on qualitative 
methodology, as the latter opens the scope for historical and empirical questions; thus, the 
method is “holistic and interpretive” (Ragin, 1987, p. 17).  
When it comes to stating and describing facts, the idea conveyed on a case is not clear if not 
compared to another case. The British poet, Rudyard Kipling, wrote: “’And what should they 
know of England who only England know.’” He tried to convey that unless a comparison is 
made there is no point of only describing a fact. Moreover, the start of a comparative research 
should be approached by stating the theory that a researcher needs to prove. From this 
perspective, the purpose of the research becomes clear, while stages and elements of 
comparison are to follow (Pennings, Keman & Kleinnijenhuis, 2006, p. 6).  
So, the comparative method is the best strategy to apply while comparing historical outcomes. 
Similarities and differences of a certain phenomenon can be analyzed while stating the facts 
that led to certain outcomes. Thus, the method of comparative strategy is best applicable in the 
approach of the thesis as two historic events that occurred during the same scope of time came 
about with different results. The comparative methodology is used to differentiate and clarify 
the political, cultural and geographical differences that led one country to one result, and the 
other country to another one.  
Why did Tunisia result in democratization but Egypt in authoritarianism? To clarify such a 
result, this research shows the events that took place over a certain scope of time. Comparative 
analysis is provided to differentiate the effects and influences of certain events related in the 









Two concepts from which the idea of the thesis emerges are democratization and 
authoritarianism. The persistence of one and the emergence of the other are the concepts basic 
to thesis hypotheses. 
 
3.1 Democratization 
A topic of great importance in the field of political sciences and international relations is 
democratization. The topic of democracy came to be of great importance especially after the 
Arab Uprising in MENA region. It is the era in which nations called for democratization of their 
countries in a cry against their authoritarian regime. The nations’ calls under the title of 
democratization included political justice, freedom of speech, and social and economic 
development.  
The question in MENA originates from the cultural, religious and economic perspectives. 
Whether Islam ever opened the way to democracy was always a question open for an answer. 
Another question in relation to democracy also emerged in relation to the functioning of 
institutions and the presidential legitimacy. Democratization is a process in which authoritarian 
regimes are turned into democratic ones. Democratic regimes are installed and consolidated 
after authoritarian regimes are overthrown (Alijla & Aghdam, 2017, p. 2). 
Samuel Huntington argues that democratization in countries is at times achieved as a result of 
foreign interference—a power of a stronger nation over the other. It was in the 1970s and the 
1980s when European, some Latin American, and Asian countries were influenced by the 
democratization ideology that America called for. Huntington goes on and argues that the 
Middle East was not part of that democratization influence (Huntington, 1991, p. 5). Moreover, 
no African or Middle Eastern country was in favor of democratization, neither were any of the 
Arab leaders. For Huntington, “it is hard to identify any Islamic leader who made a reputation 
as an advocate and supporter of democracy while in office” (Huntington, 1991, p. 22). When it 
comes to Islam, religious and political communities are not separated. Muslim countries apply 
Sharia in their laws, closing the way to democratic policies. In the past, only Turkey achieved 
a democratic secular society after being an Islamic country (Huntington, 1991, p. 28). In recent 
times, the Egyptian case was not able to achieve democracy with the Islamic Muslim 
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Brotherhood in power; on the other hand, Tunisian Ennahda Movement, as an Islamic party in 
power, could deviate from the stated, and secularized the country following the same pattern of 
the Turkish model that was brought to existence under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.  
Huntington expresses doubt on the majority of cases in relation to democracy in which Islam 
plays a major part. Though theoretically the two elements might be similar, in practice they are 
far beyond the description (Huntington, 1991, p. 28). Several questions are asked when it comes 
to countries with Islamic governmental prominence: “Would the Islamic groups gain majority 
support in those elections? If they did win the elections, would the military, which in many 
Islamic societies (e.g., Algeria, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia) is strongly secular, allow them 
to form a government? If they did form a government, would it pursue radical Islamic policies 
that would undermine democracy and alienate the modern and Western-oriented elements in 
society?” (Huntington, 1991, p. 29). Basically, Egypt and Tunisia were the two practical cases 
in which these questions were answered. An Islamist authoritarian rule of the Muslim 
Brotherhood brought about a collapse of any chance of democratization, while the Tunisian 
case proved that Ennahda’s perspective of liberal Islamism opened the way to democratic 
dialogues among the participating actors working for a democratic Tunisia.  
To achieve a democratic state, a country should pass certain obstacles. If they are not fully 
passed, reversion into authoritarianism might appear. Certain factors might highly contribute to 
the collapse of a democratic path. Factors may vary from the low level of democratic values of 
the elite and public level of people in the country; economic setbacks that might only be solved 
with authoritarian regimes; social and political polarization; clashes of middle and upper social 
powers in the country with the lower class and leftists for the purpose of excluding the latter 
from political participation; emergence of terrorism as an outcome of law break; and the 
intervention of foreign countries in favor of undemocratic state of a country. If a democratic 
country shifted to authoritarianism, it would be because of those in power that diverged from 
the way of democracy. Transitions into reverse direction, authoritarianisms, are most probably 
made by military coups in which a democratically elected president is ousted (Huntington, 
1991, p. 18). The aforementioned factors were all present in the Egyptian case when the military 
ousted the so-called “democratically elected” Mohamed Morsi (presidential term 2012-2013) 
and appointed their military general in what they also called democratic election. The so-called 
“democratically elected new president”, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (presidential term 2014-), 
practiced another form of authority which also ranges in Huntington’s (1991) explanation as 
“democratically chosen chief executives [who] effectively ended democracy by concentrating 
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power in (…) [his] own hands, usually by declaring a state of emergency or martial law” (p. 
18).  
Democracy flourishes with the economic growth. A setback in the economy reverses the 
potential of democratization. Societies with middle level of economy are likely to achieve 
democracy, while the poorer ones not. Furthermore, the issue of such transition is not solely 
related to the economic factors in MENA but rather to the religious and cultural ones as well. 
What would happen in the political domain if economic development interfered with religion 
and culture? Would cultural heritage be an obstacle in the face of economic development in the 
process of democratization? (Huntington, 1991, p. 32). The answer is: Yes, in some cases it 
would, as in the Egyptian case when economic and religious interests were of a greater interests 
to the country’s competing powers than the passage to democracy.  
Professor of strategic studies, Ahmed Hashim (2011), defines democracy by stressing the 
following: “A representative democracy presupposes that all of its adult citizens possess a body 
of fundamental rights and liberties. These include the right to choose officials in free and fair 
elections, run for elective office, express oneself freely, form independent political 
organizations, including parties, and have access to independent sources of information” (p. 
117). Could an army have achieved democracy when the only method it used to follow was 
giving and not taking orders from civilians as in the Egyptian case? The Egyptian case proved 
that this is not possible. A rather well situated army as the Egyptian one but not the Tunisian 
would not compromise its status in the country by allowing a democratic transition in which 
forces other than the ones it allows for would be able to interfere in its issues and benefits. The 
Tunisian army had no such complications in the democratization process as it had no interests 
in the country other than the smooth passage to democratization and the end of the previous 
regime. 
Raymond Hinnebusch, a professor of international relations and Middle East politics, stated 
that many researchers found the Middle East “as exceptionally culturally resistant to 
democratization.” Authoritarianism seems as persistent in the region (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 
373). Democracy cannot be achieved in authoritarian societies, only political liberalism might 
be. Another drift from democratization in the Middle East was caused by military politicization 
in governing not directly but from behind the scenes. In cases of communal conflicts, the 
leading elites are most likely to undertake authoritarian strategies (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 377). 
A great effort that the West put in the Arab world was dividing and subdividing the region into 
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smaller states, causing fragmentation of power and destabilization, which are two effects that 
hinder the democratic approach. In such weak fragmentation of states, intellectuals and activists 
are more likely to act as to prove their “identity, unity and authenticity, not democratization”. 
Furthermore, such countries start presenting threats to others in the area, and vice-versa 
(Hinnebusch, 2006, 378). Hinnebusch theory can be well perceived in Egypt where the struggle 
was always persistent in defining the Arab personality. It was the military ideology in the 
political sphere that prevailed though presidential figures, who were always of former military 
background and sought after the Arab identity. Strong relations among Arab nations could have 
contributed to their strength in the region, and would have allowed them to identify themselves 
under the Arab Unity, which they failed to accomplish. Tunisia never considered itself as 
identical to Arab identity; it was more prone to the Western identity, which goes back to the 
first president who got the position after Tunisia’s independence from French colonizers—
Habib Bourguiba. Besides, Tunisian military political presence was weak and out of planned 
political course as part of the plan put by the successive presidents. 
A conflict that arises in the process of democratization is the increase of the “economic pain”. 
Intellectuals and human rights activists always feared the instability, civil conflicts and Islamic 
victory that the path to democracy might bring in the process. The economic development 
should first be achieved which would enable nations to rise towards their intellectual 
independence and thus democracy. Middle Eastern societies should follow the East Asian 
model which notes for achieving “’economic growth first, democracy later.’” (Hinnebusch, 
2006, p. 388). Economic development enables countries’ independence from foreign 
interference as well as social and intellectual rise of the nation where citizens are most likely to 
rise above trivial issues which their countries are trying to occupy them with such as pan-
Arabism and Islamism. Having the opportunity of life with self-dignity and self-respect is surely 
the major factor of liberation from the authoritarianism form of slavery.  
Though apparently hostile to authoritarianism, the international powers seem to have no interest 
or intention in bringing democratization to MENA. The presence of oil and Israel in the region 
hindered the steps towards human rights and democracy acts. It is the Arab-Israeli conflict that 
should be solved in the region as to save the area from restlessness, yet the biased U.S. 
interference and interests make this unlikely to be fulfilled.   
A possible way to democracy in MENA might be reached by changing some major factors: 
“increased rule of law, better regulatory frameworks, educational reforms and merit-based 
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recruitment to the bureaucracy, (…) the investment and economic growth needed to expand the 
middle class, civil society and an independent bourgeoisie, while increasing regime legitimacy 
and dampening Islamist radicalism” (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 391). Such terms in MENA might 
open the way to democratization. Still the case remains an open question for as long as MENA 
remains an essential part of U.S. foreign policy’s biased interference.  
 
3.2 Authoritarianism 
Authoritarianism might be defined according to different concepts. For some, it refers to the 
kind of regime in power that got its position out of unfair elections; for others, it is the regime 
that got to power or stays in power with no periodic elections. Authoritarianism is also the 
desire for the hierarchical position in which the ones in power keep their own version of order 
through which they would be feared (Glasius, 2018).  Hence, authoritarianism is a regime type 
with its policies, ideologies and institutions that serve such a regime. 
 For some scholars—Roger Owen, Simon Bromley and  Nazih Ayubi—“authoritarianism is not 
the product of certain types of regimes but rather emerges from the nature of the states over 
which these regimes rule.” The path to authoritarianism in Arab countries came from the period 
of colonialism. The Arab world was part of the Ottoman Empire and then when colonized by 
Western countries, the system of nation-states was created in the region which defined new 
political identities in most of the countries. Later on, despite the postcolonial independence, the 
states still could not form their own state institutions because of the perpetual foreign 
domination over economy, bureaucracy, military and police (Pratt, 2006, p. 5). Resources were 
concentrated in the hands of the chosen regime allowing the creation of authoritarianism (Pratt, 
2006, p. 6).  
An obvious type of authoritarian regime is the military regime form state in which officers 
control the country directly or indirectly by virtue or force. The military hides behind the scene 
while controlling civilian leaders of former military positions (Hadenius & Teorell, 2006, p. 6). 
Egypt is a clear-cut example of military based regime which started at the time of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser (presidential term 1956-1970) and continued till the era of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The 
only time in which Egypt apparently deviated from the path was at the time of Muslim 
Brotherhood rule in the country, yet the military still had its influence on the Brotherhood role 
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as they were ousted by the military itself right after the Brotherhood deviated from taking the 
path the military dictated it to do. 
In his article, What do we know about authoritarianism after ten years?, David Art presents the 
durable authoritarianism through the concept of competitive authoritarian  regime. He explains 
that such regimes are civilian ones in which democratic institutions which are formally in power 
are safeguarded by the higher state power which they use for their self-advantage against their 
opponents. Here, the elites preserve their authoritarian power by their abuse to the institutions 
at hand (2012, p. 357). Such model of authoritarianism can be explained in both Egypt and 
Tunisia. Egyptian institutions were not even democratic, but even if they were, state benefits 
were kept only to certain elites. In the Tunisian case, the regime privileged the ones closer to it 
and eliminated actors not belonging to it from the advantages proposed in the country and thus 
exercised yet another kind of authoritarianism.  
Lynne Henderson defines authoritarianism as the power which asks for nothing less than 
unquestioned obedience with the right to use coercion and punishment if not met (Art, 2012, p. 
382).  Authoritarianism might not only be practiced by the government, but by other institutions 
in the system which the government itself allows to oppress others as to keep control. As law 
is the primary tool of any government through which it legitimizes itself, it is usually 
accommodated to suit authoritarian purposes (Henderson, 1991, p. 383). Accordingly, 
legislation takes a similar pattern in achieving the purposes the authoritarian regime is seeking. 
When changes of regime came to happen in both Egypt and Tunisia, both new regimes, and 
even transitional governments, started changing the constitutions that suited their governance. 
It was more the Muslim Brotherhood’s failure in changing the constitution for its own benefit 
that made the nation rebel and oppose Brotherhood actors and eventually oust them.  
MENA was molded into an authoritarian governance over decades. Authoritarian successors 
even developed models which suited the new regime needs after they mostly came to power by 
ousting their predecessors. Foreign interference, educational and cultural deficiency, economic 
weakness and the quest for national identity added to the rise of authoritarianism and in effect 
the absence of democracy. In the last decades, most MENA falls into the classification of being 





4 THE REVOLUTION 
 
Two MENA revolutions brought about different outcomes out of different actors’ interference 
as stated in the two hypotheses. The beginnings of events already gave clear signs where the 
two countries were heading. 
 
4.1 Egyptian Revolution 
Being encouraged by the Jasmine Revolution taking place in Tunisia, Egyptians arose trying to 
achieve what seemed at the time possible. January 25th, 2011—the National Police Day—was 
the day when people gathered in demonstrations trying to make a dream come true. They called 
for freedom of speech and press, promotion of justice, an end to emergency laws and corruption, 
a decrease in the levels of unemployment, and free elections. It was a peaceful transition in 
which people stood up against the regime and its supporters, despite some of the noisy rebels 
who were prepared for aggression in case of an attack by the security forces which were 
deployed to the arena aiming to save the Mubarak regime (Hashim, 2011, pp. 114-115). A force 
of major influence in the process of events was the military taking the side of an observer till 
further notice. The military did not have an easy decision on whether to oppress the 
revolutionaries; support them; be divided into two parts, some being supporters to the regime, 
and others to the revolution; or keep away from the events (Hashim, 2011, p. 115). A seasoned 
decision by the military was taken as they stepped away from the events and observed their 
deviation. With the passage of time, it became clear that the tranquility and peaceful state of 
the military body was nothing more than a set of calculations to be taken into account with the 
change of events. 
The first change came up when President Hosni Mubarak (presidential term 1981-2011) 
realized that concessions should be made. He publicly announced his will to only fulfill his full 
term of presidency in accordance with the 1971 constitution, after which he declared he would 
step down. That sparked a mass protest because the constitution was elegantly supportive to the 
dictatorship that the nation was willing to overthrow. Thus, the regime failed at this stage to 
provide democratization. Instead, it provided a sort of liberation while offering a “cosmetic 
change” rather than a radical one. Blinded by the military’s silent stance of showing no support 
to the regime, the public welcomed the military. The public thought that the military took their 
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side and so honored it by calling it the “Revolution’s protector”. To their naïve belief, they 
thought that the military “morale” would overthrow Mubarak and his obsolete regime. Chants 
were made by the public that the army and the revolutionaries are like one hand in the fight 
against the tyrant. A notion the public should not have forgotten was the long-term relation the 
military and the regime had which tied them together and benefited both. After all, the military 
took the generous economic benefit in exchange for Mubarak’s civil-political independence 
(Hashim, 2011, p. 116). In time, the military’s plan became clearer to the public when it itself 
took over the country’s governance through the former General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi (Fehmi, 
2012, p. 7). After this process of events, the government was not handed over to a true civilian 
leadership, but a military one instead, which shows how the process of the revolution turned 
out in favor of the military, and not public benefit. 
With the loud calls for Mubarak’s resignation causing national, regional and international fear 
for the actors involved, Hosni Mubarak resigned from his presidential post on February 11, 
2011, leaving the country to the active forces. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) directly took over the reins to keep the government in function and maintain stability 
in the nation. The SCAF showed its sweetened willingness to move the country forward to a 
new state of civilian ruling system. Promises were given that a better national, regional and 
international relations would be achieved, which would favor Egyptian citizens—none of which 
was fulfilled, and so the military quickly lost its glittery image. The public initially expected 
that the SCAF would bring former officials to justice as a way of soothing public anger—which 
has, again, not happened. The events worsened when the alleged democracy under the military 
dictatorship went out of hand when the SCAF dictated the civilian powers instead of fulfilling 
their revolutionary demands. The SCAF enhanced its power and by 2013 it made 13 major 
political parties agree to hinder the civilian rule, and stated that it was the time for military 
control in the region to preserve stability. It was proclaimed that enough time was given for the 
civilian parties to prepare for the process of taking over the governmental functions. The long 
instability of the string of events led to a greater frustration and depression on the side of the 
Egyptian public (Hashim, 2011, p. 118). Kept in the background of national politics, the 
military got its brilliant chance to secure its interests by securing the internal as well as foreign 
policy in the country.  A refusal to step back into its barracks was obvious; the military needed 
to achieve what would secure its benefits. Its interference in the constitution led to it obtaining 
authority, granting it the power over civilian politics (Ghannoushi, 2011).  
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This was the beginning of the Egyptian story that, from the early stages, showed that the 
powerful actors having the major influence on the process of events would not allow Egypt to 
take the path the revolution had aimed for. It can be clearly inferred that the military in Egypt 
had its own stance in the country through which it sought for its interests and not the interests 
of the nation. The Egyptian military is an example that proves one case of the hypothesis. The 
hypothesis states that the military had an influence in the process of revolution on moving the 
nation into either democracy or authoritarianism. The Egyptian military with its pertinent 
interests played a passive role on the side of Egyptian democratization.  
 
4.2 Tunisian Revolution 
The Tunisian story started on December 17, 2010, in Sidi Bouzid when Mohammed Bouazizi 
set himself on fire, sending Tunisia into protests against poverty, unemployment, and political 
suppression. Bouazizi fought against the humiliation he had encountered while just trying to 
provide for his family (“Jasmine Revolution,” n.d.). Tunisians felt empathy towards Bouazizi 
and started their riots and protests by proclaiming against misery and unemployment. Deathly 
events of self-immolations were signs of aggravated protests from the public side, while 
shooting and killing were committed by the regime side, specifically by the security forces. One 
of the reasons that triggered the restlessness and later the revolution in the country was the 
release of classified information through WikiLeaks on November 28 of the same year. 
Regime’s corruption and authoritarianism was revealed despite the Tunisian government’s 
effort to censor the information. The Tunisian government failed to hide the information, 
igniting the public into a sequence of revolutionary events (Masri, 2017, p. 39). On December 
28, Ben Ali announced on television that the riots ignited by the public were of negative 
prospects to the economy; moreover, he threatened those taking part in such actions with 
punishment by the regime (Masri, 2017, p. 47). When actions escalated, the government 
deployed the police to settle the unrest, yet confrontations could not be settled down. When the 
unrest between the police and the protestors reached the capital, the government had to deploy 
the armed forces to settle the unrest (“Jasmine Revolution,” n.d.). The small Tunisian army was 
of no benefit to the government and unable to be depended on, for it had no true power nor 
interest in siding with and protecting the corrupted regime (Masri, 2017, p. 47). During these 
early stages of the revolution, Ben Ali cunningly tried to provide different concessions to 
protestors. In one of the concessions he made, he offered the dismissal of the minister of 
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interior. Later, he promised not to run for a new presidential term, which was supposed to take 
place in 2014. Then, he ordered the police to stop shooting live fire on people; he reduced 
prices, allowed more freedom on the use of the internet, investigated corruption, and released 
political prisoners (“Jasmine Revolution,” n.d.). January 13, 2011 was the date of his last appeal 
on television in which he used colloquial Tunisian out of despair to address the nation to step 
aside from the revolutionary process (Masri, 2017, p. 48).  The unrest continued, leaving Ben 
Ali to the only decision possible to make—he left the country on January 14, 2011 (“Jasmine 
Revolution,” n.d.). He was advised by his security chief, Ali Seriati, to leave the country and 
return after the events settled (Masri, 2017, p. 48). Army general Rachid Ammar also asked 
Ben Ali to leave while notifying him that his days in the country are over and that “he was 
‘finished’” (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 23). After his departure, Ministry of Interior came to a decision 
by which it forbade Ben Ali’s return to the country (Masri, 2017, p. 48).  
Rachid Ammar, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, was a major figure in supporting the 
Tunisian revolution. He informed protestors of the army’s protection to the nation and 
revolution. For him it was the army’s role to side with the protestors in bringing the country to 
democracy (Kirkpatrick, 2017). The army felt sympathetic and empathetic with the 
revolutionaries’ demands. The army and the public had suffered the same struggles under the 
governance of the overthrown regime. Their mutual hardship of poverty and humiliation was 
the reason that made them both step together in the revolution (Masri, 2017, p. 47). An incident 
in which the army stepped clearly on the side of the nation happened when Ben Ali deployed 
the military to the capital to cease the protests by all means. The military later disobeyed the 
orders given and refused to open fire on civilians (Kirkpatrick, 2017). General Ammar took the 
responsibility of the decision and forbade his armed forces from the shooting order given by 
Ben Ali. The police, on the other side, was the force of support to Ben Ali and stepped in the 
battle, going for the orders given, which was shooting the protestors. The army and the police 
were at a point of confrontation. This was the stage when General Ammar warned the police of 
potential bad consequences for the police in case the forces kept on shooting the protestors. 
Military armored vehicles were safety resorts for protestors on many occasions (Lutterbeck, 
2011, p. 23).  
Now that the stage was open for different rivals in the political sphere to claim power, the 
military had its perfect chance to seek the power as well. At this stage, the armed forces could 
have acted the same as the Egyptian military did by keeping all the power in their hands. Instead, 
the armed forces clearly announced that their aim is the protection of the nation and the 
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revolution. The military promised to help the nation in its path to democracy. The military 
retreated back to its barracks while again warning the security forces to stay out of politics on 
their side as well (Masri, 2017, p. 49).  
A huge difference can be noted in comparison to the Egyptian case. The military in the Tunisian 
case had no intentions of claiming and taking over the power in the country. On the contrary, 
the Tunisian military was the facilitator to the progress the revolution made. As can be seen by 
this stage, the hypothesis on whether the military could play a role in the events of bringing the 
revolution to success would be proved right for the Tunisian case and not the Egyptian one. The 
very first steps showed how one military acted in favor of the nation, while the other in favor 
of its own benefits. The points in regard to the military in the thesis will bring about a better 
understanding of why each of the powers acted the way it did and in the process of events 

















5 THE MILITARY 
 
The chapter is related to the first hypothesis provided in the thesis. The discussion is about the 
role of the military in both Egypt and Tunisia that brought about the failure of Rage’s 
Revolution and the success of the Jasmine one as the military played an essential role in both 
countries.  
When it comes to the state of a country’s military, different concepts are put into discussion to 
understand its role. As an independent body in the country, a military can have different types 
of relations with the political system. Such relations are called the civil-military relations that 
define the military power and its role in a country. Militaries can play different roles in different 
countries in accordance with the political state of a region. Yet the general rule remains that the 
military should not interfere in civilian authority; furthermore, it should be submissive to. This 
part, as Samuel Hanington argued, could be mostly achieved in the developed countries with 
the presence of “military professionalism”. Hanington argues that “it is through the 
development of a distinct and relatively independent professional category of soldier and 
officer, and thus of military professionalism, that the military will become politically neutral” 
(Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 8). When it comes to armed conflicts, professional armed forces are the 
only body that would secure the state (Demir, 2016, p. 30). For Morris Janowitz (an academic 
on contemporary civil-military relations), the best form of civil-military relation can be reached 
through the “mutual exchange and regular interaction between the two domains” where a way 
to a civilized military is achieved through the process of conscription (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 8). 
Military intervention in political power can be observed in countries with “low political 
culture”. Samuel E. Finer, an academic on political and military affairs, goes to defining the 
political culture that he describes as the “functioning [of] state institutions and procedures 
regulating the exercise of a political power.” Thus, in countries with “low” political culture, the 
military may remove the political power or even replace it by a military regime (Lutterbeck, 
2011, p. 10).  
Amos Perlmutter gives a further clarification through the concept of “praetorianism”. “Lack of 
social cohesion, the existence of fratricidal social classes, (…), and a generally low level of 
political mobilization” are reasons for high military interference in the political decision-
making process (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 11). The military for him is defined by two concepts. The 
military “ruler” as the one who makes the decision in the political sphere, and the “arbitrator” 
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as the one who influences politics from the background. For Perlmutter, when the military is 
highly organized in the country, chances are on the rise that it will take power from the civil 
institutions. When it is forced to act against its civilians, it blames the civil authority for the 
actions it has to take (Demir, 2016, p. 32). Another scholar, Mehran Kamrava, views MENA 
as controlled by “autocratic officer-politicians”. The era witnessed the succession of former 
military officers turning to civilian politicians taking over the presidency (Lutterberk, 2011, p. 
12). Rebecca L. Schiff comes up with “concordance theory”. She argues that the structure of 
the army determines the state’s harmony between the army, politicians and society. Another 
point to be stressed is that military interests whether related to economy, politics or security 
might change military stance in a country and deteriorate even its professionalism (Demir, 
2016, p. 32). When army’s existential interests are threatened, it protects itself by all means 
especially in such cases as a mass uprising in a country (Demir, 2016, p. 32). 
Professionalism of an army makes it act independently, which gives it at critical points the 
power to intervene in the state. Peter D. Feaver stresses the concept of “civil-military 
problematique” which means that the military body created by the civil body to protect it may 
at some point be a threat to the latter; thus, some armies are intentionally weakened by their 
governments. The government in exchange blinds itself from military economy and/or political 
interference (Demir, 2016, p. 33). 
A great deal of loyalty of military to a regime in a country is related to concepts of 
“institutionalization” and “patrimonialism” defined by Eva Bellin. How a military may respond 
to protests in a country depends on the institutionalized system of that country, which separates 
it from the political power. In an institutionalized system, the set of rules is clear, army positions 
are filled in accordance with qualifications rather than nepotism, and loyalty is given to national 
interest rather than to specific individual authority keeping the armed forces separated from the 
political force in power. Its opposite concept is “patrimonialism” characterized by cronyism, 
favoritism and corruption bounding the political force in power with the army, and as such 
intimidating the mutual interests when a drastic change threatens one of the sides involved. 
Tunisia and Egypt are a clear-cut example of this difference (Lutterberk, 2011, p. 14). Weak 
and disorganized governmental institutions cause instability and armed conflicts, and if the 
coercive armed forces had not been obedient to the civil government, the conflict aroused might 
have been accelerated. “Mass based revolts have not any chance to be successful without the 
support of government’s coercive organizations” (Demir, 2016, p. 30).   
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While both Tunisia and Egypt depend on conscription in their military, a difference can be 
noticed in their reaction to events. Tunisian conscripts are mostly people coming from poor 
economic conditions, and thus felt closer with the revolutionaries and their demands. Their 
connection with the society was on a very high level. Besides, the Tunisian army was for 
decades highly marginalized and had no benefits to obtain from the regime. On the contrary, 
the Egyptian military stance towards the events had a different perspective. Though also a 
conscripted army, the economic benefits it had tied the military closer to the regime. The 
Egyptian military should have acted wisely to keep its benefits secured. Its purpose was not the 
protection of the characters in power, but the regime that would allow it to keep its economic 
privileges. Though both armies, the Tunisian and Egyptian, were professionalized and 
institutionalized in accordance to the regional standards, the Tunisian military was much more 
up to the standards of professionalization and institutionalization as well. The Egyptian military 
depended very much on cronyism and favoritism which already put obstacles in the way of its 
professionalization. The Tunisian army, on the other hand, was always kept away from 
interfering in politics by the regime, and was intentionally weakened out of fear it would obtain 
power and consequently overthrow the regime. As a result of the restrictions defined, the 
Tunisian military did not even have the opportunity to indulge in the corruption prevailing in 
the country from the regime side. The contrary was applied to the Egyptian military which was 
in fact the arbitrator to the regime. Despite the regime’s efforts to keep it away from the political 
sphere, it always had its present role in the background. The civil-military relation in Egypt was 
in between the autocratic officer-politician who held civilian positions after leaving the military, 
and the military body that kept its hidden grip on politics from the backstage to secure its 
economic interests. Presidents of former military background needed to set smart relations with 
the military, and they already knew what to do to stay in power. Yet, the economic interest that 
the Egyptian army had in the country brought its institutionalization and professionalization to 
diminishing stages, while Tunisian army’s professionalism and institutionalization gave the 
country the chance to head towards democratization. 
 
5.1 The Egyptian Military 
Since its independence from colonialization, strong foreign powers kept interfering in Egyptian 
political state through the succession of country’s leaders, all of which were of former military 
background (“Egypt's six presidents,” 2018). It was the leadership choice left by the colonizers 
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in many Arabic countries, one of which was Egypt, that brought about military figures in the 
regime. They served the colonizers’ interests in the region which borders were defined also by 
the Western interests (Fehmi, 2012, p. 12). Hosni Mubarak, the president at the time of The 
Uprising, came to the office of presidency after the assassination of Anwar Sadat (presidential 
term 1970-1981) on 6th October 1981.  Mubarak was of no charisma that would be of any 
comparison to the two predecessors: Gamal Abdel Nasser or Anwar Sadat. As a vice-president 
he was expected to hold the position only temporarily to keep away the fear of Egyptian 
instability (Hashim, 2011, p. 106). For ensuring his position, Mubarak gained the military 
loyalty by granting it enormous economic autonomy. This way, the military further secured its 
business and glorified its image in the country as a strong economic power of the nation 
(Hashim, 2011, p. 109). It was only because of the military that Egypt kept its high economic 
state. While engaging in business, the military also had control over its international and 
regional relations by isolating itself from domestic disturbances—a duty assigned to internal 
security forces (Hashim, 2011, p. 110). 
In the period of Egyptian Uprising of January 28, 2011, the military got directly involved in 
internal disturbances while protecting major governmental buildings in Cairo after the 
withdrawal of internal security forces which could not further stand the attacks.  On the 
bloodiest day since the beginning of the revolution the security forces were pushed to their 
defeat by protestors. The National Democratic Party (NDP) headquarters, as offices 
representing the regime, were also set on fire because of their ultimate support to Mubarak’s 
regime. With the collapse of civilian political institutions, Hosni Mubarak, as the army’s 
Commander in Chief, ordered the military intervention. Until the mentioned date, it was not 
clear whether the military might have had any potential plans to take over the political field 
(Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p. 15). February 10, 2011 diverted the stream of events on the side 
of SCAF.  A SCAF meeting was held without Mubarak’s participation and the result was 
ousting the president on the following day. The military directly took control over the state in 
the period between February 13 and March 30, 2011 while legal framework was formed to 
make it legitimate (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p. 16). Holger Albrech and Dina Bishara define 
February 10 as the date that changed the military from being defending of nation’s ambition to 
willing to take over “direct political management” (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p. 17). A clear 
diversion from the side of the military took place in the revolution. Apparently, it was the time 
when the military found out that it should take advantage of the situation for its own benefits 
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and purposes. As a country bordering Israel and being located in the heart of the Arabic region, 
Egypt had the need to keep its military power strong. 
Because of its geopolitical position, Egypt has always had political conflicts. Egypt led the war 
against Israel. It has always had to secure the Suez Canal (a major commercial route). Egypt 
aimed at reaching the Arabic Union with the rest of the Arab countries it might not have even 
had good relations with. As for the instability in the whole region, the Egyptian military was 
always a strong force for the purpose of defending the country. The military position changed 
a little after Anwar Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel, and most of the defensive role of 
the army in protecting it against Israel diminished. The country no longer needed protection by 
such a huge army after the peace treaty with Israel, and so started downsizing and dismissing 
the army’s recruiters. By losing its major role in the country as a protector from Israeli attacks, 
the military changed a part of its role and started investing in the country’s economy. It used its 
powers and made itself a business complex that gave it a new power in the country in addition 
to its defensive one.  
Institutionalization of the military was a lower level as cronyism spread in country system. As 
a consequence, military interference between the regime and the protestors at the beginning of 
the uprising was also kept low. The military preferred to take the role of the observer. Its 
confusion was obvious with the position it took between the anti-regime movement and the 
regime itself for it had to make the precise calculations that by time would have major effects 
on it interests in the country (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 25). When deployed to the streets, the military 
was welcomed by demonstrators, though some mistrust was shown on the side of the protestors 
which resulted in setting some military vehicles into fire. As a conscript force, the military’s 
poor lower level soldiers found themselves united with the revolution’s demands calling for 
better living conditions which encouraged even some military officers to take part in the 
demonstrations taking place in Tahrir Square (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 27). On the other hand, the 
military at certain stages left the side of the protestors by siding with the regime. In an event in 
which protestors were attacked by pro-regime “thugs” who were riding camels and horses and 
carrying cold weapons in what was later on called by the Camel Battle, the military did not 
even interfere in protecting the demonstrators. The thugs (in Arabic “Baltajiya”) crossed the 
protection lines of the military, which was supposed to be at the location for “protecting” the 
revolutionaries. This military attitude differed from the Tunisian one as the Tunisian military 
sided with the rebels against the security and police forces attacking the demonstrators. Later 
on in the process of events, the military called on protestors for several times to leave the 
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demonstrations and resume their normal life—all of which showed military’s unwillingness 
and hesitation in providing protection to the demonstrators. What could be added was the event 
of February 2, 2011 when protestors got shot by snipers. Despite their call for help from the 
military, the protestors did not get any.  Events got aggregated even more. Instead of keeping 
aside from the escalation of events, the military started participating in attacking, arresting and 
torturing demonstrators on the next day of “Camel Battle”. Demonstrators, media personnel 
and human rights activists were arrested and kept in under the supervision of the military staff.  
Thugs and snipers were let to their freedom—no action was taken against them (“Khamsat 
Awam,” 2016). In her article “The role of the army in Egypt’s new politics” (2011), Soumaya 
Ghannoushi, a researcher specialized in MENA, describes the actions the army took in Tahriri 
Square:  
(…) the army moved to violently disperse activists, beating them with clubs and electric rods 
- even firing live ammunition - leading to many casualties. Hundreds were dragged away to 
trucks and thrown in jail. Between January 28 and August 29, almost 12,000 civilians were 
tried in military tribunals, far more than Mubarak managed in 30 years of dictatorship. Torture 
by police and military personnel remains widespread with hundreds of cases involving 
beatings, electrocution, and sexual assault reported. (…). The army has since gone further, 
introducing a ban on public protest and curfews altogether. 
Fikri Nabil, a political member of Strong Egypt Party, declares that the military took advantage 
of the revolution process so that the plan of inheriting the presidency would no more be an 
available option for Gamal Mubarak (“Khamsat Awam,” 2016). The military feared that Gamal 
would inherit the presidential position in the country and so intimidate economic military 
interests in the country. The military disliked Gamal as he was a businessman but never a 
military character (Hshim, 2011, p. 13). Gamal’s business agenda came to light in between 
2003 and 2008 when corny capitalist succeeded in economy as well as in politics, but pushed 
the middle class into poverty (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p. 18). The notion of presidential 
“heredity succession” was resented by the military. Limited on national politics, the military 
had no power on changing the presidential “heredity succession” in case it became realized 
(Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 26). 
The end of Mubarak’s reign was attained when the army stepped in forcing Mubarak to resign 
on February 11, 2011. The SCAF held an independent meeting two days before and toppled 
Mubarak announcing that they stand hand in hand with the Egyptian people and their will of 
democratizing the country. The military announced opening the chance for democratic elections 
to obtain democratic leadership (Lutterbeck, 2011, pp. 28-30). Military stance was still not clear 
at this stage with the role it was aiming to achieve in the country. What benefits would the 
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military seek? Who were the members that would be allowed by its side to take part in the 
future of Egyptian politics? By time it was only revealed that “the military’s first loyalty is 
often to itself” as David D. Kirkpatrick stated it in The New York Times (2011). 
The description of events shows the hesitation the military had in the process of events. It 
shifted on whether to support the regime or demonstrators. After years, it became obvious to 
demonstrators that the military took its decision cunningly on which part to side at the very 
early stages of Rage’s Revolution. The Uprising was the best time for the military to take 
control over the political domain to secure its interests. Though the military might not be the 
direct actor in power, the political power got into its hands at this stage.   
While relating to the hypothesis, it could be stated that the military had the ultimate power in 
pushing the nation towards democratization or authoritarianism. Unfortunate for the Egyptian 
nation, the military which got in power had self-economic interests that made it keep the country 
under the firm grip of authoritarianism; otherwise, its interests would not be secured. For a 
clearer and more detailed understanding in regard to the decision taken by the military, the 
following subchapters explain the military in relation to economy, state and foreign affairs. 
5.1.1 The Egyptian Military and the Economy 
Though having restrictions in political participation, the military had a major role on the 
economy of the nation. The military took over the defense and non-defense business called the 
Military-Industrial-Business-Commercial Complex (MIBCC). The business produces 
consumer goods as “food (olive oil, milk, bread and bottled water), cement and gasoline, 
vehicles (Cherokees and Wranglers)” and has a role in infrastructure and tourism (Lutterbeck, 
2011, p. 26).  The military also produces simple military weapons, ammunitions and weapon 
spare parts which are used by the military or are being exported to different African and Arabic 
countries. It is notable in developing countries that the military uses a network of economic and 
personal relations with the public and private sector as in the Egyptian case. Thus, business 
relations have extreme effects on the deals and transactions among the actors (Ramadan, 2016). 
Military corporations in Egypt are privileged by no payment of taxes or dealing with 
bureaucratic red-tape that strangles the private sector (Hashim, 2011, p. 109). The coercive 
power business is further protected in the country by keeping its records private from the 
civilian sector. No accessible or “official data exists on the size of the military’s business 
empire, but estimates put it at 10- 40 per cent of the GDP” (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 26). The vast 
business is not under any public inspection, allowing for a wide scope of corruption and “private 
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pockets” interests. The whole business is kept hidden from public scrutiny not because of 
national defense targets rather out of non-defense business profits that it makes in enormous 
amounts. Were the classified activities revealed publicly, the military would be put to 
prosecution and trial (Abul-Magd, 2011). 
The early beginning of military gaining economic privileges was in 1952 at the time of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser. Nasser started the concept of socialism in the country and thus nationalized 
economic assets. Appointing itself as the nation’s guardian, the military soon took over the 
economic enterprises under the call that it runs people’s businesses which as the 1964 
Constitution declares should be run by them: “the people control all means of production”. 
Afterwards, the military economic state got a bit obscured with Sadat privatizing some state-
owned sectors. The situation did not last long when Sadat made the peace treaty with Israel that 
withdrew the military from its major military duties and made it search for new business 
opportunities announcing its unwillingness in laying off its recruiters. Then, the era of Mubarak 
witnessed again a privatization period as the U.S. made Mubarak go into economic 
liberalization. To no one’s surprise, military business stayed protected and out of privatization 
plan (Abul-Magd, 2011).  
When Mubarak got overthrown and Muslim Brotherhood took charge of the country, the 
military economic interests were again at stake, even though both actors seemed to find 
common grounds on the country’s economy. As things diverted from the plan arranged, the 
military overthrew the Brotherhood giving the presidential position to the next figure: Abdel 
Fattah el-Sisi, a former military general. Military economic benefits escalated with el-Sisi 
getting to the presidency. The latest Egyptian president highly depended on solving Egyptian 
economic crisis by the help of the military. An example of such a case was the infant milk crisis 
in the country. With the rising prices of infant milk, the military stepped to solve the problem. 
It made an agreement with Ministry of Health to be given the permission on importing infant 
milk and selling it by lower prices than the ones set in the market for the private sector. This 
was a new way for expanding the economic power. Another plan the military made was in 
setting a plan for the production of cancer medicine in Egypt. One of the biggest plans was set 
in the domain of infrastructure needless to mention the benefits that would flow to military 
pockets from new Suez Canal projects. The military also obtained several projects including 
the housing units and road construction projects (“Ma Huwa Wazn,” 2016). After June 30, 2013 
when demonstrations took place in Egypt to remove Mohamed Morsi from presidency, the 
military was handed up to one million dollar projects to work mostly in infrastructure including 
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construction of new highways, low-income housing, and the renovation and refurbishment of 
some public hospitals and youth centers (Ramadan, 2016). While civilian institutions got 
weakened because of country’s instability, the military got the opportunity in expanding its 
power in the country. The military got its power over all possible available sectors (“Ma Huwa 
Wazn,” 2016).  Even the Egyptian Council of Ministers preferred giving country’s projects to 
the military for its efficiency and discipline in implementing the work assigned fast and in 
accordance to high standards. In short, the military had enormous privileges over the private as 
well as public sector in the country. The abundant cheap labor force that the military used could 
by no means be applicable by the private sector. For implementing its projects, the military 
depended on the conscript labor power that is much lower paid than the labor power of the 
private sector. The Military Service Compulsory Act  enabled the military to gain its yearly 
new labour force as young men are yearly recruited into serving the country’s military. An 
additional economic advantage was in its eligibility to use any land considered as government 
property for the purpose of protecting the country. With no doubt, the military used such an 
advantage for its own interest which was more of an economic type rather than the one used for 
ensuring the country’s security. The Armed Forces Land Projects Project is an organ of the 
Egyptian Ministry of Defense. As the name implies, the project works on building housing 
units, tourism villages, different resorts and houses taking into consideration the abundant 
advantages the military gains from implementing such projects (Ramadan, 2016). 
After the peace treaty of 1979 and after limiting military’s combat functions, the military got 
its power over economy. By time, the military reached into most economic files and in the end 
took control of 80% of government land. In March 2016, the news agency Middle East Eye 
assured and warned that the Egyptian military dominates around 50 to 60% of the country’s 
economy and takes over 90% of Egyptian land. Considering itself the owner of the state land, 
the military needed to grant no payment in exchange of the government land it used for its 
benefits (“Imbratoriyat Aljaysh,” 2016). 
The further economic power that the military took at the time of el-Sisi made it keen on keeping 
on its empire—a rather negative point on the side of the military, whose role was expected to 
be more or less limited to the protection of the country. Major General Mahmoud Nasr, 
Assistant Minister of Defense for Financial Affairs, declared that after Mubarak’s overthrow 
the military would not hand the projects it held to any new authority. He considered the project 
assets to be the revenues of the hard work of Ministry of Defense rather than of the state 
(“Imbratoriyat Aljaysh,” 2016). 
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The government itself made policies that protected military interests. The government made it 
legible to hand projects and tenders to any Egyptian or foreign party adding that no third party 
objections were allowed. Analysts argue that such decisions legitimize attribution contracts 
issued by the government especially when granted to companies under the National Services of 
the Armed Forces (“Imbratoriyat Aljaysh,” 2016). 
Granted a higher economic power with higher advantages, the military pushed investors away 
from its domain. No investor would get into a trade dispute with the military, as the only way 
to resolve the conflict would be in leaving Egypt rather than seeking a reconciliation through a 
tribunal (“Takrir Khas,” 2018). 
Looking at all the privileges the military gained before, during and after Mubarak’s presidency, 
it is obvious that what it strived for was its self-protection by securing its economic status. For 
an observer of the stream of events, it would be clear that the military made a decision in regard 
to what suited its benefit and not the benefit of the nation. It stepped past and ignored the 
revolution with its demands; for if it supported the revolution, all its privileges would diminish 
by time. The process to democratization would slowly deprive the military from the empire it 
built for itself. Its economic benefits were the key reason to make the military insist on the 
persistence of the authoritarian rule in the country thus supporting the first hypothesis. 
5.1.2 The Egyptian Military and the State 
To an observer, it might seem that the military kept away from internal governing issues of 
Egypt and only had its influence on foreign policy. In fact, Egyptian military is a domain in 
which recruiters get early retirement. These early retirees are later on used in political and 
bureaucratic apparatus positions (cabinet posts, parliamentary seats, and the posts of governors) 
(Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p. 14). “It is well known to many that (…) 21 of the 29 appointed 
governors are retired army generals. This is in addition to dozens of posts in city and local 
governments that are reserved for retired officers” (Abul-Magd, 2011). For the exchange of 
stepping aside from the direct internal political interference, the military was given the power 
of dominance over an enormous part of Egyptian economy (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p. 14). 
By January 25, 2011, the military had its glamorous reputation among the public, as it showed 
no interference in the governing problems and still kept Egyptian economy on higher level. Its 
economy status was already secured by the regime and thus it did not need to directly interfere 
in politics (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p. 18). By Mubarak’s toppling, the SCAF took over the 
36 
 
political domain temporarily while allowing a new civilian government to be established. Later 
on, SCAF actions contradicted its announced claims most obviously while agreeing with 13 
political parties to slow down the civilian transition. Hence, the previously established military 
course was obviously diverted with the military showing unwillingness to step aside from its 
direct interference in politics. At this stage, the military had a firm grip over the civilian political 
body. Moreover, the military obtained the privilege to intervene in the constitution for its 
benefits so when a new president to the country would be elected, it would already have 
preserved its power. Obviously, the military interference in politics came about to ensure its 
benefits over the economic state, its relations with the U.S. in regard to weaponry and financial 
aid, and the peace treaty with Israel. The military was not willing to restart some “radical 
politics, whether pan-Arab or Islamist” at this stage. It was in fear of a new potential civilian 
government that might have put obstacles to all the previously mentioned targets (Hashim, 
2011, p. 118). While reporting to an American journalist, Army General Hossam Sweilam 
declared that the military would show obedience to the newly elected president, except on issues 
related to military affairs. A signal was given that it would be of best interest that the civilian 
government cooperates with the military (Hashim, 2011, p. 119).  
As noticed the military had already built itself a state within the state. The unrest sweeping the 
country brought it to its anxiety in regard to its economic power with the abundant advantages 
to protect (Lando, 2013). The year 2011 was a military milestone by which its role in politics 
changed. The SCAF had direct governance from February 2011 until June 2012 during which 
the military took over the media, bureaucracy, security apparatus and judiciary. At the same 
time, even more officers got positioned in governmental bodies. An alliance was made between 
the military and the MB paving the way for the latter to win the presidential election in exchange 
of keeping the same military benefits as the ones given in Mubarak’s era. With the election of 
Morsi, as the first civilian president since Egypt’s independence, the SCAF issued a supplement 
to the Constitutional declaration which forbade presidents from having authority over the 
military. Morsi kept on the role of employing retired officers in governmental sectors for 
keeping the alliance with the military. The MB issued a constitution through which the military 
had its “semi-independent status” in relation to its affairs. It was not until June-July of 2013 
that the military sided again with the public uprising against Mohamed Morsi and got him 
overthrown. The Brotherhood was even classified as a “terrorist organization” that threatened 
the national security. What brought to the event was most probably a clash of interests between 
the military and the Brotherhood that came to light, while Morsi’s policies only added to the 
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general restlessness in the country. The military directly took advantage of the national, 
regional, and international support and ousted Morsi. Some masses and different parties had no 
conflicts with the military position in the country, hence supporting it in its decision. Regional 
regimes were of the same support; Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar added “billions of dollars” to 
the ousting process, while the U.S. disregarded the action and kept its financial aid (Abul-Magd, 
2013, p. 4). Politically, the ousting was not called a “coup” as such a naming would have 
deprived Egypt from the right to foreign financial support, especially from the U.S. side. The 
American financial support is supposed to be terminated when a military topples a 
democratically elected president, as was the case with Morsi. The actors preferred to explain 
the toppling as an action taken in support of the will of people, thus dissociating the word 
“coup” from the event. 
The Egyptian military state within a state had its beginnings established with the overthrow of 
the monarch in 1952, when Gamal Abdel Nasser appointed officer corps in different positions 
in public sectors in the government to support him in his quest for a social revolution.  By that 
time, only a few military officials occupied higher positions in the late years of Nasser time, as 
well as the time of Sadat and Mubarak. Nasser changed his tactics after the General Commander 
of the Armed Forces, Abdel-Hakim Amer, planned for his ousting and failed. Anwar Sadat also 
limited the influence of the military figures in the government as part of his plan of peace treaty 
with Israel. Sadat urged the military to professionalism and kept it less interfered in civilian 
politics. Thus, the official role given to the military was keeping the country’s security and at 
times supporting the domestic stability in crisis. As such, the military had the image of a 
guardian against Islamists threatening the civil security. In 1981, Abdl al-Halim Abu Ghazala 
was appointed Minister of Defense and started involving the military in industrial and 
agricultural sectors, as its role was decreased in civil politics. In the late 1980s, the military was 
at its peak power under the guidance of Abu Ghazala who was dismissed from his position as 
noted by reporters for his political popularity that might have been a threat to Mubarak’s 
political position (“Military in Politics,” n.d.). Later on, this alleged conception was refuted, as 
Abu Ghazala was reported to be having brilliant relations with Mubarak, but got dismissed for 
his support to the Iraqi military which annoyed the Western politicians and endangered his life 
(Abd al-Hamid, 2017). Abu Ghazala was succeeded by the bureaucrat Mohamed Hussein 
Tantawi who was often called “Mubarak’s poodle” for his utmost loyalty to the regime. The 
general concept in the relation between the regime and the military in the later years was to 
keep the military away from civil politics and granting it the economic privileges in exchange 
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of accepting the successor to Hosni Mubarak’s presidency—Hosni’s son, Gamal Mubarak 
(“Tantawi «Kalb Mubarak»,” 2018). 
Nowadays, the previous General in power, el-Sisi stands as a lone player with no party or 
political entity to back him up, but actually has the Egyptian Armed Forces in support. With 
the firm grip, el-Sisi took control over the opposition, media and civil society (Atef, 2016). El-
Sisi kept strong relations with the army to ensure his presidential position. While Minister of 
Defense, el-Sisi formed a special section in the army that would protect his future position. He 
chose its members to be loyal and efficient. El-Sisi keeps on close relations with the Armed 
Forces willing to use all means to maintain the full military support which allows for some great 
economic and political privileges to be exchanged in el-Sisi era (Mujahed, 2017).  
With el-Sisi in power, Egypt was brought to be ruled with yet another dictator in power 
supported by the military. The military gave up the country to new actors in the game of 
dictatorship rather than supporting it in the struggle to move toward the democracy (Fehmi, 
2012, p. 7). The military built its state within the state which it decided to protect by all means. 
It is the time when the military had its economy state secured by tailoring the government it 
could have never achieved were it not for the events in its favor. It could be stressed, in 
accordance to the first hypothesis, that the military impeded the revolution in its quest to 
democratization. The military’s overall goal was ensuring the government with which it secured 
its interest for the time to come. 
5.1.3 The Egyptian Military and Foreign Affairs 
Because of its geopolitical position, Egyptian stability, but not democracy is of great importance 
to the West and the neighboring country, Israel, whose peace all Western countries care about. 
According to regional standards, Egyptian military was characterized by its massiveness and 
modernization especially in the 1990s, leaving Israel and the U.S. suspicious to its intentions in 
the region. In case the U.S. cut off its financial aid from the Egyptian military, such action 
would result in the collapse of strategic relations between the two countries.  Egyptian alliance 
and loyalty was a question of doubt to the U.S., which in return made it hesitant in regard to the 
aid it provided to Egypt to ensure Israel’s safety and protection (Hashim, 2011, p. 114). Not 
prepared for the war with Israel and its alliances, the Egyptian military would not put the peace 
treaty that lasted for decades at stake. Cairo realized that “modern high-tech warfare is joint 
warfare” (Hashim, 2011, p. 119). 
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The peace treaty, Camp David Accords, was signed between Israel and Egypt to ensure a 
framework of peaceful relations in the Middle East. Treaty actors were represented by the 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin. Jimmy Carter, 
the President of the United States at the time was acting as a go-between. The peace treaty was 
signed on March 26, 1979 (“Camp David,” 2017). The goal was to ensure stability and security 
in the area, and promote economic development. The U.S. was assigned to ensure that no 
violation would be exhibited on either side. The treaty defined the basic points of the relations 
between the countries. Limits of sovereignty were set, the usage of airfields was agreed upon, 
the usage of the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal were determined especially in terms that brought 
Israel to benefits, securing Egyptians and Jordanians in the construction of a highway made 
near Eilat was focused on, and situating the military forces was appointed (The Camp David 
agreements,” 1979, pp. 208-209).  
With the peace treaty, the Egyptian military was limited in combat. This enabled it to deviate 
its attention towards some of the internal functions and in particular the economic functions of 
the country. To protect Israel and ensure their political presence in Egypt through international 
relations, foreign countries supported Egypt with financial aids.  
Gamal Abdel Nasser was not in favor of U.S. relations. He called for Arab Nationalism and 
made close relations with the Soviet Union against the West with its support to Israel. Only 
later in 1979 at the time of President Anwar Sadat, diplomatic relations came to existence 
between Egypt and the U.S. after “Camp David Treaty” was signed. As such Egypt became the 
Western ally in the region in the fight against terrorism and as such earned its position in 
obtaining the provision of American foreign financial aid (Schmitz, 2014, p. 353). 
The idea of U.S. aid provision was initiated in 1961 when two administrative agencies providing 
foreign aid disbursements were established. The first one is called the Foreign Assistance Act 
(FAA) under which the U.S. provides assistance to a country undergoing a military coup.  The 
support is given till democracy is achieved in a country. The other aid is the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) which was established simultaneously by an 
executive order to provide technical and rebuilding assistance. The United States also provides 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for achieving “national security objectives, commercial 
interests and humanitarian concerns” (Schmitz, 2014, p. 351). The FMF provides Egypt 
annually with 1.3 million dollars in exchange for its peace treaty with Israel. 
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Egypt became the fifth largest beneficiary in receiving a $1.5 billion in 2012. The number 
covers 80% of Egyptian expenses in the procurement of arms (Schmitz, 2014, p. 354). Yet the 
U.S. under the administration of Barack Obama had some hesitations on whether to turn a blind 
eye on the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi for the sake of its regional interests or to follow its 
legislation and cut the aid. The FAA is to be provided after a coup occurs and a new democratic 
election of presidency succeeds. The newly democratically elected president should not then be 
overthrown by the military. Following the rules, the FAA should have been stopped once 
Mohamed Morsi was overthrown by the military as he represented a democratically elected 
president (Schmitz, 2014, p. 352). Governments ignored the word “coup” in the process of 
events and proclaimed Morsi authoritarian; moreover, evidence about Morsi’s manipulative 
electoral process was brought to light. The lack of Morsi’s electoral transparency convicted 
Morsi and made the U.S. ignore its hesitation while keeping on its friendly relations with Egypt 
(Schmitz, 2014, p. 373). Obviously, keeping financial support flowing to Egypt prevailed the 
American interests. It was not the time for cutting Egypt from its agenda. 
President Mohamed Morsi tried to keep Egyptian relations with Israel at peace. Despite being 
more in favor of Palestinians than Israel, he promised to keep up with Cairo’s international 
obligations (“Israel Rejects Revision,” 2012). By keeping up to some stable foreign policies, he 
ensured the flow of military financial support. Unfortunate for the MB, the uprising events were 
not in its favor but the military’s. Events led to Brotherhood overthrow by the military General 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.   
El-Sisi kept on close relations with Israel; this way he ensured his relations with the U.S.. In 
the era of Egyptian pro-Arab nationalism, Israel was portrayed as being the “top enemy” of 
Egypt as well as to the Middle East. By time, the concept got changed with the change of 
interests and so Israel’s concept of being an enemy changed especially at the time of el-Sisi. 
Though the Egyptian society was for some time against normalizing the relations with Israel as 
a result of the Egyptian indulgence in proving their pro-Arab identity, their government was 
forced to normalize its relations with Israel were it willing to protect its international relations. 
Keeping stable relations with Israel was what Washington targeted for. In spite of the critical 
atmosphere that prevailed the America-Egyptian relations at the time of Obama’s presidency, 
the relations took a better turn with the later president—Donald J. Trump. It was the human 
rights violation that Obama was critical about in regard to Egyptian army intervention in 
resolving conflicts. For Trump’s administration, Egypt is the key element in achieving stability 
in the Middle East (Khaled, 2018). After all, for protecting relations the flow of financial 
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benefits was kept active as long as presidents of countries kept sharing mutual interests. Foreign 
policy is of great influence on a country’s internal situation.  
Regional alliance with the el-Sisi “military regime” proved effective. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
the United Arab Emirates supported the military coup against Morsi; furthermore, they assisted 
el-Sisi to his presidential position. The financial aid provided by the countries reached 12 billion 
dollars in support for Muslim Brotherhood overthrow. These countries share the same 
perspective in regard to Egypt’s importance in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt is 
Israel’s protector which is best achieved by el-Sisi in power (“Arbaat Asbab,” 2015). 
Saudi Arabia needed to stop the MB form spreading in MENA. As Salafists and leaders of the 
Islamic nations, Saudis feared the MB prevalence over the region which could by time 
intimidate and overgrow the Saudis. Action had to be taken against the MB expansion. In 
exchange for military’s opposition to the rule of MB and Morsi’s overthrow, Saudi Arabia 
agreed to annually finance Egypt up to 150 billion dollars. Saudi government participation in 
the overthrow was faced by severe criticism of MB supporters living in Saudi Arabia forcing it 
to step aside from this arena. Later on, Saudi government support got recovered after receiving 
orders from Trump to assist el-Sisi in his protection to the Zionist and the American war against 
terrorism and certain Islamism sects (“Tafasil Daam,” n.d.). 
The West is in need of MENA and so all efforts are to be exerted to keep it under the control 
of superpowers. MENA leaders are assigned in their positions by the superpowers as the USA 
in which these leaders are no more than puppets that the West controls. Washington needs to 
protect its allies in MENA. It is a matrix in which all parties should function for a goal that the 
West defines. MENA countries are part of the matrix in which U.S. protects regimes not 
individuals (Fehmi, 2012, p. 174). Juan Cole, an American academic and commentator on 
modern Middle East, states that Egypt is highly important to the U.S. in regard to American 
safety and prosperity. In one of his articles, he comments that “we [Americans] are fooling 
ourselves if we don’t at least care because our own fate is wrought up with that of the 
Egyptians.” The reasons are mainly dependent on Suez Canal through which the American 
trade passes. If Egypt were not under control, commodities shipped to the U.S. as well as oil 
prices would soar. Washington needs to keep a close eye on the country to keep it safe in 
accordance with its own benefits and never forget that that includes the peace and safety of 
Israel (Cole, 2013). Israel is kept secured with the American-Egyptian alliance because no Arab 
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country is capable of war waging on Israel if Egypt did not participate on the Arab attacking 
side (Najjar, 2017).  
That being so, the military was fully supported by foreign relations and their financial aids. The 
aid was provided to the Egyptian military so that foreign countries could get their own benefits 
as well—all of which enabled the Egyptian military to go on with the practices it did. If 
restrictions were put on Egyptian politics and the military was not funded by regional and 
international countries, General el-Sisi would not have got his position secured after 
overthrowing the Brotherhood. As it can be inferred, the support that the military got financially 
and politically from the West enabled it to pursue the plans that were obviously approved by 
the regional and international society. This fact once more proves the hypothesis stated that the 
military with the support of the foreign countries enabled the continuity and persistency of 
authoritarianism which is the policy the West seems to prefer in MENA for keeping the interests 
safe.  
 
5.2 The Tunisian Military 
Tunisia’s post-colonial history with its leaders’ ideology was essential a stage to its current state 
especially in relation to military. Safwan M. Masri, (2017), describes Tunisians as fond of their 
“proximity to Europe (…) [and] proud national identity.” The national identity was molded into 
the society since Tunisia’s independence from the French colonists in 1956 (p. xxx). “Reformist 
politics” were introduced to the Tunisian society by the first post-colonial President Habib 
Bourguiba (presidential term 1957-1987) (Murphy, n.d.). Bourguiba came to presidency with 
Tunisia’s independence after years of struggle against the French colonizers (“Man Huwa,” 
2018). In the year of 1957, Tunisia was proclaimed a republic after abolishing the monarchy 
(“Tunisia |Country Profile,” 2018). Bourguiba was a master negotiator and had great persuasive 
skills, yet used force when required to realize his goals. His path followed a realistic doctrine 
in which he saw that Tunisia should achieve four major pillars: be liberated from the colonizers, 
achieve secularism, follow pro-Western policy and develop effective economic plans. As a 
secularist, he deviated from religious doctrines and adopted a secular constitution in the 
country. He discouraged any compliance with religious ideologies and passed a law in which 
he forbade women to wear veils, arguing that veils impede development and modernism. 
Bourguiba followed the Western liberalism while abandoning Arab nationalism, and as such 
his political agenda was up to the Western policy. He encouraged the U.S. presence in the region 
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proclaiming it as Tunisia’s protector from the surrounding autocratic regimes. Though not in 
favor of communism, he had no dispute with the Soviet Union neither did he have any military 
or economic deals with it, considering it a country of destructive ideology. His relations with 
Gamal Abdel Nasser were of no positive prospects as Bourguiba followed a different ideology, 
looking at essential Arab issues from a different perspective as in the cases of Palestine and 
Arab National Unity. He did not find himself united with any of the cases. He was well cautious 
of Baath Party and prevented its organizational expansion in Tunisia. Bourguiba was in 
continuous struggle with Muammar Gaddafi and feared Libyan-Algerian conspiracy and for 
that he asserted his relations with the U.S. and France. As for Israel, he was a peacemaker and 
called Palestinians to concede with the Palestinian-Israeli division of land (“Man Huwa,” 2018).  
Though not a retired military general, Bourguiba was still an autocrat—an experienced lawyer 
who knew how to keep a firm grip of the country. He mainly depended on cronyism and put 
most of the executive power in the presidency. In his tactics, he abused human rights issues but 
still led Tunisia to its independence, modernism and secularism. His major effort was put in the 
educational system of the country. Bourguiba wanted the Tunisian society to be educated, so 
his major motive was creating generations with “skills of critical and analytical thinking”. 
Bourguiba’s regime was highly differed from other countries’ ones which nations were 
obedient and unquestioning to them and their Islamic instructions. Yet Bourguiba at times 
depended on Islamic history in his calling for women liberation (Masri, 2017, p. xxxi). His 
policies were independent of military in the control of the country and his approach opened the 
way for Western ideology and liberation with the analytical and creative thinking. Bourguiba 
allowed unions and parties to operate in the country.  
Bourguiba’s reformism developed the General Labour Union (UGTT) that had a considerable 
role in the revolution and its way to democracy. It was this civil society for which Bourguiba 
planted seeds and for which the revolution opened the way for flourishment. In 2015, a Nobel 
Peace Prize was granted to “the Tunisian Quartet du dialogue national for ‘its decisive 
contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia.’” The quartet included four 
major unions: Union  générale tunisienne du travail (UGTT); Union tunisienne de l’industrie, 
du commerce et de l’artisanat (UTICA); Ligue tunisienne pour la défense des droits de l’homme 
and Ordre national des avocats de Tunisie. The organizations represented workers, business 
owners, human rights activists and lawyers, all of whom saved and put Tunisia on its democratic 
path (Masri, 2017, p. xxxii). The UGTT had 150 offices in the country allowing it to have a 
great influence on the revolution. It pushed people to be active in the process. Its members were 
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in full support to the protestors and were of great assistance when negotiations came to a dead-
end (Masri, 2017, p. 15). 
Taking into consideration the political nature of the country, Tunisian military had a quite 
different role in the country than that of the Egyptian. Tunisian armed forces were the smallest 
in size in comparison to other Arabic countries, and were made up of 40,500 members out of a 
population of 11 million. It was an army that fought no bigger wars and was basically 
imprisoned in its barracks. During the presidency of both Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali, the army was never well financed or equipped (Grewal, 2016); therefore, as an 
institution it never developed ties that would bond it to any of the regimes. Despite the 
previously mentioned, Tunisian military had its essential role in the country’s path to 
democracy. 
Tunisian military siding with protestors can be explained through the civil-military relations in 
the country. While appointing civil leaders of previous military background in Arab countries 
in post-independence period, Tunisia appointed a lawyer as its president, not opening the space 
for military interfere in politics. Moreover, French republican concepts were applied through 
the nation because of Bourguiba’s Western ideology (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 21). Bourguiba’s 
successor, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (presidential term 1987-2011), held before his presidency 
some different positions: the head of Tunisian military security, state secretary for national 
security, and head of national security (“Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali,” 2018). Ben Ali had the same 
stance in relation to military. Despite an “autocratic officer-politician”, he distanced the military 
from politics. Though keeping a keen eye on military out of fear of potential overthrow, the 
regime still enhanced the professionalization of the armed forces which resulted in a highly 
civilized military that was different from Bin Ali’s regime in regard to corruption and cronyism 
(Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 21). Tunisian military had no strong relations with political leadership; 
on the contrary, it had quite good relations with the society. As a conscript army, it had its force 
coming from different social classes but most of which came from poorer conditions and thus 
bond in the demands of the revolutionaries. Thus, the army, under the General Rachid Ammar, 
refused to fire on protestors and warned the police on the matter as well; the army would clash 
with the police in case firing was aimed towards demonstrators.  In the process of events, the 
army had the opportunity to take over the government as the Egyptian one did, but did not 
follow such a path out of political neutrality and professionalism. Throughout the revolution, 
Tunisian army kept neutral and independent from the state; it preserved itself from interfering 
in its issues. The position that the Tunisian army held was an outcome of no personal or 
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organizational interests in the state. The army was fully independent and had no interests 
threatened were the regime changed (Demir, 2016, p. 38). In fact, the armed forces were 
professional and apolitical from the time of Tunisia’s independence (Demir, 2016, p. 39).  
Being privileged to professionalism and institutionalism and not having beneficial bonds in 
relation to the regime, the Tunisian military had the opportunity to prove its professional ability 
in protecting its country. The time came when the military needed to protect the nation from 
national forces rather than the regional and international ones.  The military had the chance to 
prove its loyalty to the nation and country, not the regime in power. Tunisian military had a 
different story to share than the Egyptian military, as it did not use the revolution to achieve its 
self-benefit. Jasmine Revolution brought the hope and the way to escape from authoritarianism. 
The way was never simple and was full of obstacles, but the chance was at least given. Referring 
to the first hypothesis, Tunisian military helped the country’s revolution to democratization, 
taking into account the economic, governmental and foreign relations factors prevailing the 
country. 
5.2.1 The Tunisian Military and the Economy 
The relation that the military in Tunisia had with the economy is different than that of the 
Egyptian. Tunisian military is the one that was kept away from the economy. It is a “military 
[that] was essentially placed on ice by former President Ben Ali—and was weak even under 
Bourguiba—so it had no access to significant resources even of a strictly military variety” 
(Springborg, 2011, p. 398). The army came into existence on June 24, 1956 with a number of 
5000 soldiers, some of who already served in the French army before Tunisia’s independence 
(“Tunisian Armed Forces,” 2017). At the time, the military was absent from the political, social 
and economic scene in the country which was quite different from the Egyptian scenario. 
Bourguiba feared a potential military coup, so he marginalize the power of the armed forces. 
The military tried to overthrow Bourguiba in 1962 under General Al-Azhar Al-Sharaiti after 
which a number of military figures were imprisoned and others sentenced to death. Hence, the 
National Guard got empowered over the military which created enmity between the two parties. 
Ben Ali’s regime had the same stance towards the military or somehow even worse than that of 
Bourguiba’s. During Ben Ali’s era, certain officials were accused of Islamism and others of a 
coup attempt—the military got even further restricted. No promotions were allowed, 
retirements were enforced on over-qualified officials and budget was extremely limited. The 
role of the military was clearly stated in defending the state and in being responsive in cases of 
46 
 
natural disasters. In short, it got totally excluded from politics and economy—the military 
became marginalized (“Al Jaysh Sayaudu,” 2011).  
Ben Ali’s government allocated a low spending on military that reached no further than 1.4 
percent of the total GDP (Grewal, 2016). It was the way to control it. Ben Ali and Bourguiba 
kept the allocation on the same scale. According to Parsons and Taylor (2011), the military was: 
poorly funded and deliberately isolated from political decisions.  Even President Ali’s 
predecessor, Bourguiba, kept the military small, under resourced, impotent, and busy 
defending the borders due to his concern of subordinating the military to civilian control.  The 
TAF boast the smallest force (Tunisia-37,000, Algeria-147,000, Egypt-469,000, Libya-
76,000, Morocco-196,000) and defense budget (Tunisia-1.2%, Algeria-3.8%, Egypt2.2%, 
Libya-2.8%, Morocco-3.3%) of all Northern African states (p. 12). 
According to WikiLeaks, Mr. William J. Hudson who served as a U.S. ambassador in Tunisia 
(2003-2006) reported that the economy of Tunisia was controlled by “The Family”. The Family 
was the title given to Ben Ali’s family with the relatives from his wife’s side—Leila Trabelsi. 
Tunisians complained about the corruption that was present in the economy caused by the “few 
elite”. The Family had the power in every economic sector which in effect caused the biggest 
frustration in the country. They covered all fields “from information and communication 
technology, to manufacturing, retail, transportation, tourism, banking, and agriculture and food 
processing.” They were similar in the economic power as the Egyptian military.  It was the 
power of corrupted relatives who were led by Ben Ali. Hudson added that “all key decisions, 
especially related to investment and privatization, (…) [were] made at the highest levels of the 
government—probably by the President himself” (“Corruption in Tunisia Part II,” 2006). The 
Family restricted freedom of investment and threatened all that dared to resist and confront 
(Parsons & Taylor, 2011, p. 11).  
As such Tunisian military was much weaker than those in other MENA countries. It was “in 
the shadow of the country’s domestic security services.” It was an army that was much different 
than that of Egypt; it had no experience in combat besides it did not dominate the economy of 
the country either (Anderson, 2011). Such an army had no privileges to lose were it not 
supportive to the regime and by such it sided with the protestors in their revolution to overthrow 
the corrupted regime. Relating to the hypothesis, the Tunisian military was the tool that helped 
the nation in combating authoritarianism. The military had no privilege on the side of the regime 
or in relation to the economy in the country so that it would need to enforce a certain type of 
regime, mostly authoritarian, that would support it in securing its objectives. The military could 
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take advantage of the revolution and monopolize the economy for its own benefits, but instead 
remained professional and retreated to its barracks. 
5.2.2 The Tunisian Military and the State  
Tunisian military ideology was of apolitical perspective towards the government. Bourguiba 
formed an army that was limited in size and budget. “In 1985, the armed forces numbered a 
mere 35,000.” Instead, Bourguiba depended in his security on Ministry of Interior under which 
he had his national guard. For Bourguiba the military was always kept away from political 
domain (Masri, 2017, p. 14). Money allocated for the military did not reach further than 2 
percent of the gross domestic product and things did not much change even at the time of the 
successive President Ben Ali with the GDP allocation of 1.4 percent (Sorenson, 2007, p. 107). 
For securing himself, Ben Ali also depended mostly on police and was highly skeptical towards 
the armed forces. Hence, no power was given to Tunisian military so that it could not have a 
critical effect in the process of political development in the country in the way the SCAF 
interfered in Egypt (Masri, 2017, p. 14). The fear of a military coup that was witnessed in other 
regional countries made Tunisian regime weaken the capabilities of its armed forces (Grewal, 
2016). The armed forces were established after Tunisia’s independence and were given no 
legitimacy in governing; thus, they were kept away from political intrusion and interference 
(Sorenson, 2007, p. 106). Bourguiba kept on diplomatic relations with the countries rather than 
dragging Tunisia into war, so there was no need for a well competent army to be formed. During 
this period, 40 to 50 percent of GDP was invested on education and social services leaving a 
very small percentage to be invested in the armed forces. Instead of making the Tunisian 
National Guard part of Ministry of Defense, its role was allocated to be part of Ministry of 
Interior for keeping the National Guard and the military away from conspiracy prospects against 
the regime (Grewal, 2016). Military figures were forbidden from any participation in political 
parties which discouraged their political interests on the long run (Barany, 2011, p. 27). After 
mid-1980s, Bourguiba started changing the policy of the military as he sought protection when 
police and National Guard showed inability in settling domestic turbulence. Modernization was 
taken into consideration and the military was funded four times higher than before in addition 
to being supplied with arms from the American side (Grewal, 2016).  
During this period, the military obtained more power and got a bigger role in securing the 
country. At a point, officers obtained political roles as was the case of Bin Ali who took higher 
opportunities and got himself into Ministry of Interior. Ben Ali later became the Tunisian 
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ambassador in Poland, then the secretary of the state for national security, interior minister and 
eventually the prime minister (“Zain El Abidin,” n.d.). It all proved that Bourguiba’s policy in 
keeping the military away had its rational perspectives. The time came when Ben Ali himself 
overthrew Bourguiba accusing him of medical unfitness for the governing role while appointing 
himself to presidency (Grewal, 2016). 
With Ben Ali as president, some senior officers got promoted to political positions. In May 
1991, accusations were brought against some military officials by Ministry of Interior about a 
plan on which they plotted and conspired with Ennahda aiming at a coup against Ben Ali. 
Though denying such accusations, Ben Ali forced the military officers to retire and appointed 
them for ambassador positions outside the country. Consequently, the military in the country 
got financially abandoned and restricted, while financing and weaponry were allocated to 
Ministry of Interior.  The military budget was 165 percent of that of Ministry of Defense, thus 
turning Tunisia into a police state which marginalized the military. When the Chief Staff of the 
Armed Forces General Said El-Kateb retired in 1991, Ben Ali in person took over the position 
depriving the army from its autonomous decision-making. Favoritism played an essential role 
in the regime of Ben Ali. Some military positons were divided among few of those who were 
favored by the regime and were trained in France and the U.S., while those who were not 
favored were punished by being deployed to Libya or Egypt with which Tunisia had little 
cooperation. As a result to such kind of regime-officers relations, majority of officers did not 
feel committed to Ben Ali’s regime (Grewal, 2016).  
Ben Ali appointed himself as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in accordance to 
Article 44 of the Constitution that states the position is to be given to the president. Thus with 
such an extreme power over the military, he had the power to interfere and intervene in military 
purchases of equipment from foreign states while controlling the communication especially 
with the U.S. military while allowing one email for communication and time span of a ten-
minute call, which was usually cut off when overpassed (Parsons & Taylor, 2011). The relation 
between the man in power of the regime and the military was on no common ground of mutual 
benefit.  
The military kept apolitical and did not interfere in the revolution on the regime’s side because 
Ben Ali kept always closer to the police and security forces and distanced himself from the 
military. In the 1990s, Ben Ali made the police obtain the authority over the armed forces after 
removing senior and junior military officers while accusing them of Islamist bias. Distancing 
49 
 
the military form the regime gave the former the chance to fraternize with the demonstrators 
and their calls when deployed throughout the country. The military bonded with demonstrators 
after they were sniped at and killed by the police (Masri, 2017, p. 47). Refusing to shoot 
protestors after General Rachid Ammar  disobeyed the orders given by Ben Ali gave the former 
extreme popularity at the time. Ammar became the power that helped Tunisia overcome 
revolutionary obstacles when faced with security troubles. General Ammar was appointed in 
April 2011 as the Chief Staff of the Armed Forces and thus revived the army’s role in the 
country—Ammar took over all decision making. No one understood the country better than he 
did and in the process, he made decisions and took the decisions on behalf of Ministry of 
Defense. At a certain point, he had the same power that Ben Ali had beforehand, yet the fight 
for Tunisia’s democratic transition kept him away from going after personal interests (Grewal, 
2016). He was simply not such a figure, but a man of honor. 
After the formation of National Constituent Assembly in 2011, a Troika government was 
established out of a coalition of Ennahda, the Congress Party for the Republic (CPR) and the 
Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties (FDTL or Ettaktol) with governmental 
responsibilities divided among them. This reflected Tunisia’s adoption of parliamentary system 
(“The Tunisian Troika,” 2012). The Troika had the power over the military. At this stage, the 
control over the military changed from being exclusively presidential as in Ben Ali’s time to 
the control presented by shared responsibility between the president and the prime minister. 
Then the 2014 constitution changed again the leadership of the military. The president gained 
again the role of the commander in chief having the power over foreign relations and national 
security, while the prime minister and the minister of defense controlled more routine defense 
and military affairs. By that time, the military had several actors interfering in its management. 
The actors interfering were the president, the prime minister, minister of defense, parliament, 
military adviser, NSC and Security Council (Grewal, 2016). They all contributed with their 
inputs thus decentralized the military and gave it the institutional role (Bonhomme, n.d.). Such 
a strategy was followed out of fear that the military might go for a new coup. 
By time, General Ammar got accused for not further pursuing his professional role when two 
of his soldiers died and two others were wounded because of a roadside bomb which took place 
on June 6, 2016. Ammar resigned so that he would not lose face if he got dismissed by the other 
officials. His resignation did not calm the atmosphere of the coup fear as restlessness was still 
on the rise. What added to the fear was the Egyptian coup to President Mohamed Morsi in 
which the military played a major role. Streets were crowded with a new uprising and calls 
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were up for ending the Troika and dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly. The 
summer of 2013 witnessed Tunisia to be on the verge of following the Egyptian path. President 
Moncef Marzouki (presidential term 2011-2014) with the Troika government tried to deviate 
Tunisia’s scenario from that of Egypt’s by arranging two major strategies. The first strategy 
was related to a decision of leaving the position of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces vacant 
after General Ammar’s resignation as to weaken the coordination between the army, navy and 
the air force and thus allowing a lower possibility of potential coup. The second strategy was 
related to occupying the military with the position of commanding the customs officers and 
local police at the military zones along the borders of Libya and Algeria in its protection strategy 
against terrorism in the region. It all gave the military a stance of professionalism so that when 
calls for a coup arouse against the National Constituent Assembly in August and September 
2013, the military defended the building even when some police officers siding with the 
protestors. Once more, the military played the major role in not allowing the revolution into the 
claws of civil war (Grewal, 2016).  
Things changed for the military now. While at the time of Ben Ali the military received a budget 
lower than that of Ministry of Interior, between 2011 and 2016 the budget of Ministry of 
Defense grew by an average of 21 percent each year (“Tunisia - Military Expenditure,” n.d.). 
While only the police had its importance at the time of Ben Ali, it is now the time that every 
force has its own importance: the police, the military and the national guard—each one on its 
own. In 2014, the military also signed contracts with the U.S. funding Tunisia with military 
equipment needed from weaponry to different army vehicles, so FMF had Tunisia as part of its 
consideration (Grewal, 2016). 
As Tunisia was still not well secured, civilian officials agreed on posting military officials in 
civil posts. The military gained its value back in authority. An Association of Justice for 
Military Veterans was also established after the revolution as to restore the human rights 
deprived from a number of former military members that were dismissed from their duties with 
the regime of Ben Ali. A dark chapter was turned over in regard to the relation between the 
state and the military as well as human rights issues in the case. The new era in Tunisia opened 
the space for new organizations to be established through which retired officers could 
communicate with the civil society and educate it on military perspectives in accordance to the 
democratic change in the country. New organizations were established through the years: the 
Association of Former Officers of the National Army (March 2011), the Tunisian Center for 
Global Security Studies (November 2013), and the Association of Veterans of the National 
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Defense Institute (July 2015). These organizations had bonds with the civil society as well as 
Ministry of Defense which provided collaboration on the issues aroused. Though some concern 
might have recently appeared in relation to the changing stance of the Tunisian armed forces, 
the military still declared its support and participation for a democratic transition of the civilian 
government. The issue of greater importance on the rise of Tunisian military was its bond to 
democratic principles (Grewal, 2016).  
Referring to the hypothesis, Tunisian military passed through different stages in its relation to 
the state. At some point, it was marginalized, while at some other it had some roles to play in 
the country. The general attitude the government had towards the military was to keep it away 
from power out of fear of a coup. The role given to military through years made it empathize 
and step on the side of the nation in its aim to succeed with the revolution. The military had the 
ability to take over the state after the revolutionary chaos but preferred to hand the leadership 
to the newly formed Constituent Assembly. The military kept its stance in being professional.  
5.2.3 The Tunisian Military and Foreign Affairs 
Tunisia kept close relations with France from its independence in 1956 as Bourguiba was 
committed to certain terms with France, especially economy, security and education. Moreover, 
French language was dictated to be prominent in the country. As such, “Eurocentric policies” 
followed in Tunisia made countries such as France supportive to the nation against regional 
opponents (Masri, 2017, p. 9). In foreign policy, Bourguiba was bonded to European strategy 
and distant from the Arabic one. He stood independently from other Arabic nations. Tunisia’s 
relations with Egypt, for example, were not on good grounds even at the time of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser who thrived for Arab Unity. Ben Ali also had the same strategy of “Arab isolationism” 
(Masri, 2017, p. 10). Tunisia was not a major target for American foreign policy as it lacked oil 
and strategic importance of Egypt; furthermore, the size and limitation of its army gave the 
country its strength and not its weakness as it did not threaten Western policy (Masri, 2017, p. 
14). Tunisian army threatened neither regional nor international affairs. Despite these facts, 
countries in the game realized that the outcome of Tunisia’s revolution would basically affect 
the regional and international security. As such, U.S. took a role in the process of events. It was 
seen that authoritarian dominance in Tunisia would have brought to negative consequences in 
the security of the region and international interests the way it did in Egypt. Tunisia was not 
planned for authoritarianism as Egypt was. El-Sisi got well established relations with the West, 
yet his inner policies of combating terrorism had problematic effects in the region. The 
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counterterrorism he declared on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that troubled in Sinai 
was “counterproductive”. It would be troublesome to the U.S. to be dragged into yet another 
war state in case the autocratic military regime prevailed. Instead, democracy was to be brought 
to Tunisia in combination of moderate Islamism. To fulfill the plan, the U.S. policy was directed 
in favor of assisting Tunisia’s economy that would give it the space of economic development 
rather than the autocratic military suppression (Zenko, 2013). The U.S. found itself obliged to 
provide Tunisia with financial benefits to stabilize its economy as well as equip its army so that 
Tunisia could be protected from Libyan terrorism. Thus, through U.S. financial aid, Tunisia 
would not be in need to seek alliance with the rich regional countries that were not in favor of 
its democratic plan as Algeria and the United Arab Emirates (Cherif, 2015).  
France’s stance towards the revolution was not clearly defined at the beginning. When the 
revolution aggregated, France was about to send troops to Tunisia in the process of restoring 
order in the country as this would strengthen the already established relations “between the 
kleptocratic Tunis regime and France”. Later on, the increase in protests made France change 
its strategy (Hashim, 2011, p. 112). Looking at Tunisian revolution from a different perspective, 
France’s decision also emerged from its own interests in keeping peace in Tunisia by 
establishing democracy. Again, it was the fear of yet another country that might be an open 
stage for terrorism in the region in addition to the illegal migration to Europe that would emerge 
out of restlessness state (LeVine, 2011).   
Foreign countries relations with Tunisia, especially the American and French, were not initiated 
at the time of the revolution. Relations were established at the time of Tunisia’s independence, 
as Tunisia lacked domestic arms industry. The U.S. military assistance to Tunisia started in 
1957. At the beginning, the aid was not on big scale but in 1969, the U.S. provided air force 
equipment through Military Assistance Program (MAP). International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) was also allocated to Tunisian National Army (ANT). The U.S. sold Tunisia 
military equipment under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program (“Tunisia - Foreign 
Military Assistance,” n.d.). What increased the support of foreign countries to the ANT was the 
Gafsa incident in which Libya and Algeria conspired to destabilize the Tunisian regime and 
sent Tunisian’s opponents to Gafsa where they attacked Tunisian soldiers and killed some 
others as well. The incident made the weakness of Tunisian security and army obvious (Al 
Jazeera, n.d.). The U.S. supported Tunisia’s deficiency and as such provided a source of 1 
billion dollars for this particular case. The U.S. also supported Tunisia for the sake of countering 
Libyan regime in the region. Tunisia was funded by FMF in numbers of 8.3 million dollars in 
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2008, 12 million dollars in 2009 and 15 million dollars in 2010 (“Tunisia - Foreign Military 
Assistance,” n.d.). In 2014, the U.S. decided to provide Tunisia with another financial military 
support that reached up to 60 million dollars that empowered Tunisia in its fight against terrorist 
attacks of Ansar Alshia. Ansar Alshia attacked the American Embassy in Tunis in 2012 while 
also attacking Tunisian borders with Algeria. The West plan was put in place to keep Tunisia 
settled in the region (“Washinton Tukadem,” 2014). To support the “War on Terror” in the 
region, allied countries needed to cooperate with each others (LeVine, 2011). Tunisia was a 
major partner of the U.S. in its war against terrorism on international, regional and national 
bases. In 2011, the U.S. funded Tunisia with what was more than 225 million dollars for its 
fight against terrorism. The U.S. also granted 100 million dollars to Ministry of Defense so that 
the security of the country could be fostered. U.S. took over military officials training while 
keeping them appropriately equipped to be capable of self-defense on Tunisian borders (U.S. 
Embassy in Tunisia, n.d.). Tunisia was in the plan to be kept politically stable contrary to the 
atmosphere prevailing the region; the Western Sahara needed some stable posts from which the 
U.S. could lead its operations (Guerdoud, 2018).  
U.S. had its interest in Tunisia; however, Tunisia also had the interest in building relations with 
the U.S. as Bourguiba’s relations with Islamism and Arabism were not on good terms. 
Bourguiba rejected Nasser’s ideology of pan-Arabism; the Israeli prime minister advised 
Bourguiba to keep strong economic American relations because of the case. Out of the alliance 
that Tunisia made with America and Israel, a financial support of 20 million dollars was offered. 
The West target at the time was to break the Egyptian-Syrian attempt of achieving Arab Unity 
with the rest of Arab countries which would weaken Israel and put it at stake in the region 
(Alkahlawi, 2017).  
France as well had its relations with Tunisian military by making a liaison with Tunisian 
Ministry of Defense. France guided Tunisia on its logistic and organizational issues. Mutual 
exchange on officer training and support was regulated between the two countries as well. The 
French also equipped the military, and later after 1980 the U.S. had the prevailing military 
assistance to the country. The military assistance provided was not only exclusive to France 
and the U.S. but also some other European countries which took part in the process. Britain, 
Italy and Sweden were the most prominent on the matter. Out of the Arab countries, Kuwait 




The question remains: why would European countries support Tunisia in its independence and 
quest for achieving democracy? One of the reasons that Haitham Soleimani, a researcher in 
Maghreb affairs, stated was that France and the other European countries needed to protect 
European borders from the illegal migration that took place across the Mediterranean. Another 
reason that France stated was Tunisia’s unfortunate geographic position between Libya and 
Algeria. Algerian unsettlement was the issue of concern to France; it planned to interfere in 
Algerian case from Tunisian lands. Obviously, France’s collusion with Tunisia had some 
“conspiracy” towards Algeria as Hamma Hammami, a Tunisian political leftist, stated 
(Soleimani, 2015). France’s aim as well was to return to North Africa after years of losing its 
crucial influence in the region. France wanted to keep its presence in the region the same way 
that other foreign countries were present in Libya. France needed to get its power back in the 
region after years of being dragged away. Tunisia could give France a base to make it close in 
solving its problems with Libya that threatened French national security through terrorism and 
clandestine migration (“Al Amn Wal Iktisad,” 2018).   
Apparently, Tunisia had a major role in North African region especially in relation to foreign 
countries’ interests. These countries always had specific targets in Tunisia and thus provided it 
with different military, financial and strategic support. Countries of greater power (U.S., France 
with some other European Union countries in support) were behind some essential political 
benefits in the country and as such were in support of Tunisia’s safe passage to stability and 
democracy. Tunisian democracy is a file of great interest to the West. The same goes with Saudi 
Arabia who is an ally to U.S. and as such keeps on the track of U.S. policy in the region; 
consequently, it shares same interests that Western countries have in the region. 
Referring to the hypothesis, Tunisian military with its foreign relations had an effect in moving 
Tunisia towards democratization. Foreign countries’ policies were to keep Tunisia safe through 
democratization and not authoritarianism. These countries needed bases in North African 
region and it was to their interests that Tunisia should be kept safe. Tunisia’s file in its relations 
with the Western ideology made the West encourage democratization. The military was the 








Parties had essential effects in the Arab Uprising especially the Islamic ones that were 
shadowed for decades under the overthrown regime. At the beginning stage of the revolution, 
these parties were given the power to become active. Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and 
Tunisian Ennahda were both given chances to governmental power in their countries. As each 
party had certain ideology that it shaped since its establishment, each had a different reactive 
response to the events taking place. The second hypothesis is discussed in the chapter in regard 
to the different approaches that parties in each of Egypt and Tunisia followed, allowing 
authoritarianism to be intensified in Egypt while opening light for democratization in Tunisia.  
 
6.1 Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
The organization of Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin) had its fluctuating periods 
since its establishment in 1928 (Aknur, 2013, p. 7). A principle that the Brotherhood believed 
in was the unification of all Muslim countries from Spain to Indonesia making the area as one 
“large Islamic empire (or caliphate)” which could be liberated from “Foreign Imperialism” 
(Ghanem, 2016, p. 12). When established, The Egyptian Brotherhood had some very strong 
relations with Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States which funded the MB. The organization had 
branches in 70 different countries. The Sunni organization also made bonds with the Iranian 
Shia and spread to other organizations such as Hamas, Al Qaeda and other Muslim groups. In 
1950s, the MB assisted the Free Officers Movement against the British, but later on got no place 
in the new regime established. In 1954, the organization was accused of an attempt to Nasser’s 
assassination, and so the regime gained the right to torture, execute and imprison its members 
which in effect pushed the Brotherhood to go underground. With Anwar Sadat succession, the 
Brotherhood was given more freedom “to counterbalance secular opposition from Nasserist, 
Marxist, and nationalist circle” held against Sadat (Aknur, 2013, p. 7). In the years when 
Mubarak came to presidency, the MB role shifted again in the country. Not a golden time for 
the organization though it held a better position if compared to other Islamic groups who were 
directly suppressed by the military and security services. Hindered in the country’s elections, 
the organization deviated its political interests towards boards of trade unions and thus had its 
power in all professional fields (Aknur, 2013, p. 8). Mubarak’s overthrow gave the Brotherhood 
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a new stage to proclaim in the new era of Egyptian politics through which it tried to assert itself 
in the region.  
In June 2012, the Brotherhood won the so called democratic elections. The MB was not ready 
to lose the elections under no circumstances. The expert on Egyptian politics and MB in Egypt, 
Eric Trager, was told by one of the Islamists that they (the Brotherhood) “‘are ready to die like 
the martyr (…). We win or we die.’” Their unjust way of winning the election was clear through 
their campaign. The MB bought lots of votes through the vast social services networks it had, 
while at the same time prevented Christians in some cities like Minya from their right to vote—
it was done from behind the scenes. The Brotherhood threatened on going on demonstrations 
and troubling the economy were they to lose the election. In short, they were prepared to take 
the case to the utmost fight to win (Trager, 2012). 
 At the beginning of the revolution, the image the Brotherhood advertised publicly was in 
President Mohamed Morsi’s willingness to follow a moderate Islamic policy which would 
establish the ground for the democracy the uprising demanded for in replacement of the 
authoritarian regime (Aknur, 2013, p. 2). Ineligible to represent itself as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the organization stepped to the elections as the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) 
and won by 51.7 percent of votes. Hence, the elected President Mohamed Morsi in an attempt 
to assert himself in the position soon started with some changes in the country (Ankur, 2013, p. 
3). It should be noted that during the election period, Morsi was one of the two candidates 
presented by the Freedom and Justice Party to win the presidency, yet he was not the one desired 
by the party to win the election. He was considered “’the spare-tire candidate’” as the party 
wanted the millionaire businessman, Khayrat al-Shatter, to get to presidency but could not 
because of legal problems that made him disqualified (Ghanem, 2016, p. 16). Morsi changed 
some major officers in charge including the minister of defense and sent 70 prominent generals 
to their retirement. In August 2012, Morsi transferred the power of generals to presidency. In 
November 2012, he changed the constitution granting him far-reaching power. He granted 
himself the right to take any measures for which he would have sensed any threat to “national 
security”. In December 2012, he started inserting Islamism into constitution through a 
referendum (Aknur, 2013, p. 3). The new constitution was being criticized by being too Islamist 




In short time, it became obvious that the Brotherhood was not in control of the country. Sarah 
Lynch reported on March 31, 2013 through the daily newspaper USA Today that the Egyptian 
economy was heading to the stage of collapse as unemployment rose, the Egyptian pound 
dropped, tourism decreased, food prices increased, unrest spread in streets, and security 
disappeared on a large scale (Lynch, 2013). After a year of being in the presidential office, 
Morsi was accused by the nation of being obsessed to gain political power in the country rather 
than develop economic and social state. After being ousted by the military, Morsi was trialed 
for the actions he had taken against the nation. He was accused of human rights violation against 
protestors who were unlawfully detained and tortured because of their protests. One of the other 
charges Morsi was convicted of was leaking classified documents to Qatar, some of which 
included detailed information on the armed forces and Egyptian policies. Another conviction 
was related to terrorism out of Morsi’s conspiracy with foreign organizations which endangered 
Egyptian national security (“What's Become of Egypt's Mohamed Morsi?,” 2016).  
The MB was accused of exploiting religious doctrines for its own benefits. It tried to initiate its 
Islamic project instead of working for democratic Egypt which angered the public (Monier & 
Ranko, 2013, p. 116). The Brotherhood was following a “supranational Islamist agenda” which 
would drive Egypt to become a part of (Monier & Ranko, 2013, p. 117). When getting its 
influence over Egypt, the organization would later move towards the rest of the Arab world 
(Aknur, 2013, p. 2). Egyptian fear arose when they realized that the pattern they chose for 
achieving democracy turned into yet another form of dictatorship—this time an Islamic one 
(Monier & Ranko, 2013, p. 117). The fear also arose from a regional Arab country that got 
worried about the empowerment of the Sunni organization which would in time deprive it from 
its privileges. As protectors of Mecca and Medina, the Saudi rulers were not in favor of MB 
that might depose them from the power they had over the Islamic nations. 
Not being able to keep up with the promises of moving the country into democratic state, MB 
“become not only an enemy of the revolution, but a terrorist group threatening the nation’s 
borders” (Monier & Ranko, 2013, p. 116). With the events deteriorating, the emergency state 
was announced and raids were launched to clear the MB sit-ins. The organization was even 
pronounced by the government as terroristic after the incident of a suicidal bombing taking 
place outside a police station (“Muslim Brotherhood,” 2018). The Brotherhood had violent 
clashes with the military and civilians that brought to notice its terrorist nature. Events were 
spotted on their shops burning in Upper Egypt, killing civilians and attacking police stations 
(Abul-Maged, 2013, p. 5). 
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Though an Islamic society, Egypt has never been an Islamic state. In the events taken after the 
revolution, Islamists should have kept good relations with the military to keep themselves in 
function. At a time, “a two-way political dance” was active between the military and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, being the strongest Islamist organization in the state (Hashim, 2011, p. 123). Yet 
instead of following the path that would give it the military support, the Brotherhood might 
have obviously portrayed itself powerful enough to keep its governance, not taking into 
consideration the threat it caused on the side of the military with its economic privileges in the 
country. Suez Canal was one of the issues that caused controversy in the country against the 
Brotherhood. Khairat el-Shater, the businessman and FJP member, tried to arrange contracts 
with Qatar and other Asian countries for economic projects by which these foreign countries 
would rent the canal and then bring financial investments to the region for their own benefits. 
The Brotherhood was planning to get their own economic benefit out of the contracts as well 
even if that meant selling the country to foreign nations. In return for the favor that the 
Brotherhood would give Qatar, Qatar would undertake allying with Egypt and support it in its 
foreign relations with the Gulf, the USA and Europe. Thus, Qatar would be able to invest for 
its returns in the area for a time of 25 to 99 years (Hidaya, 2012).  
The end of MB happened because of several reasons as well. A year of MB ruling brought 
about the new public outrage on June 30, 2013. The Uprising made the military interfere once 
more to end yet another regime in the country. The new outrage was a consequence to the 
ideology followed by the MB in their year of governance. The Brotherhood did not consider 
including itself slowly into the system. As a radical group, the Brotherhood did not consider the 
need for reforming country’s policy. The Brotherhood did not consider the mistake it made 
while trying to monopolize the country and use it for its own benefit. It started taking over the 
political sphere while shaping the constitution and laws solely pushing aside any other force. 
The organization opposed the rest of the forces that were part of political changes, including 
the military and the judicial system trying to domineer rather than reform those systems. The 
Brotherhood positioned themselves superior to other actors, bringing resentment to their 
approach in political as well as public domain. They made the atmosphere of conspiracy prevail 
(El-Shobaki, 2013).  
Though supported by the armed forces to obtain the presidential position, the Brotherhood did 
not maintain the relations which might have kept it in power. Promising the military to keep its 
privileges and control from behind the scene, the Brotherhood did not fulfill what was agreed 
upon. Interests between actors soon showed to be different. When the organization’s role came 
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to an end, the Brotherhood protested in the streets against its overthrow causing insecurities and 
by time even pushing the military to open fire on the organization it protected two years ago. 
These events accelerated as the Brotherhood became a “threat to the army’s economic interest” 
which it did not take into consideration. Moreover, the organization did not restore order but 
caused local disorder showing that it all brought was “more a cost and less a benefit”. Trying 
to diminish the military rule in the country, the Brotherhood showed the lack of competence to 
the ambition it had. De Swarte states that “each time the Islamist organization has tried to get 
the upper hand, the army has put it back in its place and made clear it would not let that happen” 
until Mubarak scenario got repeated. The Brotherhood called for military protection, yet the 
latter found no gain in the event. As a power of structural advantages, the military had its power 
prevailed. The military saw no “strategic interests in having the (…) [Brotherhood] on its side” 
(De Swarte, 2013).  
The unrest that the Muslim Brotherhood caused by its governance bought about its fall in the 
end. As an organization which was marginalized over the years by the successive regimes, it 
came to power with clearly no crystalized vision on the strategy to be followed in the country. 
Lost in the greed for self-aimed purposes, the Brotherhood had no bounding relations with the 
other forces in the country. What it aimed to achieve was getting the autonomous governance 
in the country while ignoring a force such as the military to start with. While trying to get the 
Asian investments in Suez area, the Brotherhood threatened the military power in relation to its 
economic complex. Such an arrogance towards the military would not have been met with 
tolerance on the side of the military.  
Though an Islamic society, Egyptians would not tolerate the fact that the Brotherhood was 
Islamizing the country. The neighboring country, Saudi Arabia, was also threatened, with its 
Western allies having their benefit and interest in the region. The policy of greed and self-
empowerment made the Brotherhood slip to its end.  
Hence, a huge difference can be noted in regard to the different approach taken by the other 
Islamic party, Ennahda, in Tunisia which put all the effort to exclude itself from violence and 
short political vision. On the contrary to Ennahda, the MB made domestic, regional and 
international forces all step together in action of ousting the organization from governing in the 
region. In relation to the hypothesis stated, it could be inferred that the major Egyptian Islamic 
Party (the Muslim Brotherhood) was one of the reasons that opened the chance for yet another 
military coup in the country. Instead of searching for means to democratization, the 
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Brotherhood aggravated the chances of going back to authoritarianism, though maybe a better 
chance might have been given to Egypt in case the Islamic organization followed some of the 
shared interest and open dialogue strategy as the one followed by Tunisian Ennahda. 
 
6.2 Tunisian Ennahda Movement 
The Tunisian case according to the second hypothesis is a proof that parties had a major effect 
on the transition of a country into democracy. Though an Islamic party, Tunisian Ennahda had 
a major influence in bringing Tunisia to its democracy through the transitional process in which 
it played a major role. Tunisia’s Ennahda case differed from that of Egypt where the Muslim 
Brotherhood role prevailed. The Islamic Ennahda already had a history of struggle to be 
recognized in the country. The party held to intellectualism while combining it with a mix of 
modernity and Islamism. Thus at the outburst of Jasmine Revolution, Ennahda had the 
prevailing power recognized by Tunisian citizens who contributed to its reaching the vote of 89 
percent of seats of a total of 217 in the Constituent Assembly formed as a transitional 
government (Shobaki, 2016, p. 2). The percentage of seats given to Ennahda made it part of the 
established Troika, giving it the power to rule in coalition with the other two secular parties 
(Ettakatol and Congress for the Republic (CPR)) (El Amrani, 2013). Ennahda defined itself as 
a political national party with Islamic reference. It worked with the other political parties in the 
system within the framework of Tunisian Republican system. The targets achieved were in line 
to bring to modern, prosperous and democratic Tunisian society (Ennahda Movement, n.d.).  
When established, Ennahda was a party that did not favor Bourguiba’s Western ideology. The 
party prioritized cultural and intellectual Islamic ideology at the time of Bourguiba’s 
westernization and secularization. Ennahda was against the westernized ideology that France 
seeded in Tunisia to keep it as its last bridge to its lost colony (Shobaki, 2016, p. 42). Ennahda’s 
ideologies were all against the political perspectives to which the country was heading. These 
actions made Tunisian regime restrict its activities in the era of post Tunisian independence. In 
1987 with Ben Ali’s presidency, some power was restored to the party, yet when gaining some 
power through electoral seats, competition arose against the ruling party. This opened the 
sphere of a potential threat to the regime which in time announced and titled Ennahda as 
illegitimate. As a result to the accusation, many of the party’s members were imprisoned, while 
others escaped to their exile (Shobaki, 2016. p. 47). This historic path formulated Ennahda’s 
ideology that differed from the prevailing regime. A party whose members were imprisoned 
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and sought exile formulated strong ideologies that called for liberation in Tunisia. Ennahda was 
characterized by its demanding and fighting ideology in pursuing its goals calling for a 
pluralistic and secular society.  Its major target was the national reconciliation and the call for 
the uprising against the dictatorship (Jamaoui, 2013, p. 160). After its recognition in the country 
on March 1, 2011 (Masri, 2017, p. 57), Ennahda called for the formation of civil society and 
democratic country in which different parties would participate in forming the democratic 
Tunisian society (Ghannouchi, 2016). Parties participating in the role were of different 
ideologies and could be broadly defined by a mix of religious, secular, pan-Arab, national, 
modern and conservative ideologies. They, along with Tunisians, called for “No Islamism, no 
theocracy, no Shari’a and no stupidity.”  (Masri, 2017, p. 56). On October 23, 2012 Ennahda 
put an agenda to fulfill in which it focused on 364 major issues that were of concern to Tunisian 
citizens in achieving their dreams and ambitions. The aim was also to uplift the social and 
economic status of the country and to achieve justice and political pluralism (Jamaoui, 2013, p. 
161).  After all, it was the Jasmine Revolution that paved the way for Ennahda to get into the 
Constituent Assembly as the nation was well familiar with all the years of the of struggle the 
party had against the old regime (Ghannouchi, 2016). ).  Public preference of new parties had 
no relations with Ben Ali’s regime. The public was resistant to any authoritarian party that 
prevailed through the years which gave Ennahda its power (Masri, 2017, p. 57). The Constituent 
Assembly later on called for a new constitution which stated the formulation of a parliamentary 
assembly—the ideology that Ennahda already called for at the beginning of events. 
Furthermore, the Assembly formed did not consider the Islamic Sharia to be involved into the 
constitution and thus the new constitution was made to serve the democratic transition where 
law prevailed and civil, political, religious, social, economic and cultural rights were preserved 
(Ghannouchi, 2016). Furthermore, Ennahda announced its aim in separation between religion 
and politics making its members Islamic democrats trying to solve Tunisia’s daily problems 
rather than going into religious preaching (Ghannouchi, 2016). Even the constitution had 
positive changes. The constitution was set after the independence from the French and asserted 
the country as “a free, independent, and sovereign state, and that its religion is Islam, its 
language Arabic, and its system republican” (Masri, 2017, p. 60). “The 2014 constitution added 
a second article, which cannot be amended: ‘Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship, the 
will of the people, and the supremacy of law’” (Masri, 2017, p. 61). Perspectives changed after 
the Jasmine Revolution. The Islamist Ennahda shifted in the role from being the Islamist 
outlawed opposition party that should be rejected, restricted, imprisoned and exiled to the party 
that later governed the state through its coalition with the other two secular parties in the Troika. 
62 
 
Troika had the mission of solving difficulties the country was facing. The problems included 
the restoration of human rights, improvement of economic situation, provision of new job 
opportunities and preservation of ruling that brings to democracy. The task of keeping up with 
the nation’s expectation was not easy.   
Ennahda diverged from other Islamic groups in calling for democracy and announced its 
participation in the democratic elections. Yet with the fluctuation of events, the party was 
accused of trying to Islamize the country after being empowered in its political positions. 
Secularists proclaimed that some of the amendments suggested by the party were of a setback 
nature. Though later announcing its unwillingness to participate in presidential elections (Masri, 
2017, p. 59), 2013 witnessed protests against Ennahda similar to the ones of Egypt’s which 
ended in ousting Muslim Brotherhood’s Morsi (Masri, 2017, p. 18).  
With the demonstrations in streets demanding for ousting the Troika, the military kept aside 
from the pressure of public demands. No violence was used in the events, while some parties 
stepped in to open the space for new dialogue between the Troika and the opposition to reach a 
reconciliation. The four participating parties in solving the dispute included Tunisian General 
Labour union; Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts; Tunisian Order of 
Lawyers; and the Tunisian human Rights League (Shobaki, 2016, p. 49). The results following 
the dialogue made Ennahda step aside from governance replacing it by the technocratic 
government formed by Mehdi Jomaa on January 27, 2014 (Shobaki, 2016, p. 50). The chance 
was given once again to Tunisia to abandon violent conflicts that might have arouse in case 
Ennahda was not willing to go for negotiations.  
Ennahda was the party that followed the democratic path while ruling. It is the party that 
rejected violence and adopted the method of dialogue. Ennahda leader, Rached Ghannouchi, 
believed that a country should be the home to all its citizens regardless of their doctrines and 
beliefs. He criticized Islamic parties that had no belief in democracy and clarified that 
democracy is part of Islamic doctrines. He believed in parliamentary pluralism and adopted 
some Western notions which would allow Islamic countries getting familiar with the Western 
experiences (Shobaki, 2016, p. 55). Ennahda did not use Sharia in the constitution arguing that 
Sharia was not to be applied in Tunisian secular society which economic and social problems 
should be solved in accordance to the nation’s will and law (Shobaki, 2016, p. 117). The party 
visioned Tunisian transitional period with Sharia excluded as it would be nothing but a barrier 
in the path. 
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Ennahda’s path differed from that of the MB in Egypt which closed its society to religious 
doctrines. Ennahda distanced itself from the traditional closed Salafism and kept open to 
reformism and social renewal (Jamaoui, 2013, p. 163). The party also publicly kept away from 
the radical political Islamist parties, Salafist and Jihadist movements as they were in opposition 
to democracy. At the same time, it kept moderate relations with the secular parties (Jamaoui, 
2013, p. 165). Struggling with the disadvantages left in the country by the old regime, Ennahda 
tried to cope with the public demands in the fastest time possible. It was challenged by the 
neighboring countries unrest especially the Egyptian ousting of MB. Ennahda found itself 
facing accusations and under the pressure of people’s demands for its removal. As a party 
believing in democratic Tunisia, Ennahda stepped aside from the governing role and handed 
the country to a technocratic government formed by Mehdi Jomaa that would prepare for new 
elections.  
The technocratic government later on was able to manage the referendum of the new 
constitution and helped in parliamentary and presidential elections. In December 2014, Beji 
Caid Essebsi (presidential term 2014-) won the elections and so became the new president of 
Tunisia. The government was formed of secularists and Islamist including Ennahda who agreed 
on cooperation and usage of dialogue (Ghanem, 2016, p. 23). 
The Islamic party of Tunisia differed in approaching events from the Brotherhood in Egypt. 
Ennahda’s effort in bringing the country to democracy kept it on the right path. First years of 
the old regime break were of essential importance. If the Troika in which Ennahda had a major 
influence had not pushed the country into dialogue, Tunisia might have witnessed the Egyptian 
scenario in which events might have taken the path of yet another authoritarian regime. Ennahda 












7.1 Egyptian Results 
The first hypothesis:  
The Egyptian military had the ultimate role in ensuring the prevalence of authoritarianism and 
dictatorship in the country. The military had important economic interests that it had to secure. 
Moving the country to the state where democracy could prevail would deprive the military from 
its assets and privileges. The military had power over almost 60 percent of the country’s 
economy which advantage would be lost were democratic regime in power. Democracy would 
mean opening military files even to public and revealing what was classified for decades. 
Democratization would give equal chances to other actors interested in the economic sector of 
the country. This would surely bring other forces that would compete over military privileges. 
Institutional economic privileges—exemptions from taxation, land ownership, project 
assurance, etc.—would surely not be granted only to military force. 
To preserve its economic status, the military had to ensure the government that would come to 
power and serve military interests as well. Though trying for a period to portray itself as the 
nation’s savior, the military could not preserve its image for long. It appointed civilian power 
to govern with which it established alliance preserving its benefits. The new established 
government was soon toppled as it did not compel with the military interests that were agreed 
upon. The best way to keep the firm grip over the country was achieved when appointing the 
previous General el-Sisi in power. The fluctuating image of the military between good and evil 
was revealed with this last action. The military ended the chances for the democratic passage 
by establishing the new authoritarian regime in power.  
Foreign relations that preserved the military and its goals played an important role in the game 
of authoritarianism. Regional and international countries seemed to prefer the autocratic regime 
in the region to keep their interests. For decades, foreign countries provided financial aid which 
was even intensified to bring the military to its power in the nation. The Brotherhood regime 
was toppled by the military which preserved its interests and abided to the regional and 
international requests.  
The military in Egypt had the essential role in ending the path to democratization that Rage 
Revolution thrived to achieve. 
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The second hypothesis: 
The major Islamic organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, that came to power after the 
revolution to restore the stability and bring about democratization, had only a reverse effect on 
political atmosphere. With the lack of expertise in politics, the Brotherhood handed the country 
to authoritarian power. The ideology followed by the party served nothing but its economic 
benefits while spreading Islamism, not considering that it is the time to work for the benefit of 
the whole Egyptian nation. The Brotherhood showed no expertise in the domain it held with 
shortage of knowledge in regard to politics. Unfortunately for Egypt, the Brotherhood 
contributed to the authoritarian power that prevailed hence. 
The Islamic party of Muslim Brotherhood supported the prevalence of authoritarian regime and 
ended the process of any possible democratization. It showed no signs of democracy at least 
from its side while in power.  
 
7.2 Tunisian Results 
The first hypothesis: 
Tunisian military had a major influence in opening the scope to democratization. The military 
had no economic advantages in the country to preserve, had the regime changed. It had also no 
hidden interests as to not allow the change to democracy to take place in the country. Being 
able to take over the country’s economy after the revolution, the military moved away from the 
action while keeping professional and taking the decision in favor of democratization. After the 
overthrow, it retreated to its barracks while keeping an eye on national security. Economic 
privileges did not drag it to step against the will of nation.  
In regard to its relation to the state, Tunisian military was always marginalized. It witnessed the 
fluctuating periods in having its officials appointed into political positions and then excluded 
from the domain. Presidents in the post-independence period were always scared of a coup so 
they kept the military apolitical. Some of the critical decisions in relation to military were even 
issued by the president who gave no autonomy to military decision making. As a result, the 
military had no defined political interests in the regime present in the country and thus was able 
to empathize with the nation’s revolution in bringing the country to democracy. Even with the 
revolutionary abyss, the military preferred handing the government to civilian authority that 
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would lead to democratization. According to the hypothesis, the kind of relation the military 
had with the state supported the military in its decision in empathizing with the national 
demands for democratization.  
Tunisian foreign relations affected the military as well the process of heading toward 
democratization. Western countries needed to make Tunisia stable so that they could have a 
base out of which they could manage their operations in North Africa. Most probably, foreign 
countries alliance determined that the Tunisian file seemed to fit the process to democratization 
it would allow. Consequently, the military got financed for empowerment so that it would be 
capable of defending the country. Tunisia got financed from Western countries so that it would 
not need to seek alliance with some other countries that might impede democratization and keep 
authoritarianism. The military had foreign countries’ support to stabilize the country and lead 
it to democratization. 
Tunisian military had a role in supporting Jasmine Revolution and opening the path for the 
country to head towards democratization. 
The second hypothesis: 
The Islamic party of strongest influence in Tunisia had its effect in moving Tunisia to 
democratization. Ennahda could have followed the method of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 
which the Brotherhood tried to deviate the Egyptian scenario to their own benefit. Instead, 
Ennahda tried to keep with public expectations. It maintained the secularization of the country 
and kept dialogue with the opposition when problems arose. The party followed no violent 
approach when a new outrage started. It sided away from events and handed the country to a 
new government in the hope that the new government would manage to fulfill public demands. 
Relating to the hypothesis, the Islamic party of Ennahda played an essential role in moving 










The long period of authoritarianism that MENA underwent came to a divergent point in the 
region. People could no longer be submissive to the dictatorship prevailing and sparked a 
revolution for their dignity and self-respect. Some even martyred themselves dreaming to give 
their beloved nation the opportunity to offer respectful life where people would get their basic 
human rights fulfilled. Unfortunately for the majority of MENA countries, revolutions brought 
nothing but sorrow which was manifested in war, torture, aggression and even more corruption. 
The only country of great luck that stood out from the rest of the region was Tunisia. It was the 
country where the spark got ignited while its flame is still burning the obsolete. It is still not an 
easy mission for Tunisia and the road is still long to go, yet efforts are still being exerted to 
bring the country to the peaceful shore. On the other hand, Egypt is a sad story to narrate. A 
story of clashing powers for self-benefits while showing arrogance towards the common good. 
Would Egypt even be able to give its people the respect a human is supposedly granted at birth? 
The thesis is the story of two countries at their turning points in history. Each country is 
harvesting the years history gave it and prepared for this day. Obviously for Tunisia, the years 
of investment in education and modernism made Jasmine Revolution blossom, while Egyptian 
ideology of nothing but military regime made Rage Revolution burn to ashes.  
Major actors in the country decided where each country’s fate would flow. Military and Islamic 
parties were of essential influence in the process of events. And while the Tunisian military put 
the nations’ case as its privilege, the Egyptian one cared about nothing more but its economic 
wealth. Protecting its economic interests, the Egyptian military invested into all possible plans 
to secure them. It cunningly maneuvered the events for its benefits and played the smart role to 
drive the country to the outcome that it suited. Though trying to manipulate the nation showing 
the false support to the establishment of new civilian government, the military pretention game 
got revealed when the new civil government partially excluded the military from the economic 
and political field. The military directly overthrew the civilian government as it did not cope 
with the orders given. As a strong force in the heart of the Arab world and while occupying one 
of the most important geopolitical positions, the military was able to keep the support of foreign 
countries to its favor. Foreign countries’ interests in Egypt seemed to be the same to the 
military’s that added to the military power in the country. The military with its power and the 
power of superpower nations in support was able to smother the spark of hope for decent life 
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the nation had. Even actors of Islamic organizations added to the revolutionary plunge. The 
inexperienced Islamic party of Muslim Brotherhood in the field of politics looked after its own 
interests instead of considering the existence of the surrounding vultures and protecting the 
country from their claws. The Brotherhood added nothing but more confusion to the country.  
The Tunisian case is of a greater difference when compared to the Egyptian one. A country that 
was over the years educated and open to the West was given the chance to use what was invested 
in it through the years. It was proven that the policy that the first post-independence President 
Habib Bourguiba followed came to be fruitful. No one would have expected that Tunisia would 
be the only country in the region to be given the chance to make the first steps towards 
democratization. After decades of investment in its culture, the process became fruitful. As 
professionalized and institutionalized, the military in the country had nothing to do but fulfill 
the mission it was assigned for—national protection. For the military, the country should be 
kept safe from international, regional and national invasion. As a professional force, the military 
had no prospects in country’s economy and thus was not tied to the old regime were it to fall. 
As professional force, the military had its duties assigned with no need of forming a state within 
a state or interfering in the political sphere. The military handed the government to civil actors 
and retreated to its barracks. The international and regional interest was also up to bringing 
Tunisia to its democratic path that helped in fortifying its mission to democratization. Even the 
Islamic parties in power were of a modernized ideology. Not being into extremism, the Islamic 
parties opened the way to dialogue as a method by which violence was avoided.  
The story of the two countries shows how history always comes to life in the present. What was 










9 SUMMERY OF THE THESIS IN SLOVENE LANGUAGE 
 
Tema in cilji raziskave 
Srednji vzhod je regija, ki je bila vedno ključnega pomena, zaradi svoje geografske lege in 
naravnih bogastev. Posledica te privlačnosti je bilo konstantno tuje vmešavanje, ki je ustvarilo 
v posameznih arabskih državah zelo raznolike politične razmere. Od osvoboditve od kolonialne 
nadvlade so bile te dežele, kljub specifičnosti vsake od njih, zaznamovane s prevlado 
diktatorskih vodstev. Politične spremembe v regiji so se zgodile vedno z razlogi na katere 
moramo biti pozorni, ker arabske dežele tudi pomembno vplivajo na ostali svet, s svojimi 
odnosi do tujih držav, ekonomskimi odnosi, delovanjem v borbi proti terorizmu in tako vplivom 
na mir in stabilnost v svetu. 
Vstaje, ki jih je doživela regija ob koncu leta 2010, so bile dramatična sprememba za Srednji 
vzhod in severno Afriko. Vse se je začelo v Tuniziji in se kot domino efekt razširilo ter dobilo 
ime Arabska pomlad. Egipt, Libija, Jemen, Sirija in Bahrein so skušale doseči kar je dosegla 
Revolucija Jasmina v Tuniziji—demokracijo. Na žalost jih je odmik s poti privedel nazaj v 
avtoritarizem. 
Pomen raziskave je v razglabljanju, kako doseči demokratizacijo na Srednjem vzhodu, ki je 
videti kot da je odporen nanjo. Reakcija vojske je imela odločilen vpliv na izhod revolucije. 
Vojska je v Tuniziji delovala profesionalno in se postavila na stran ljudstva, proti avtoritarni 
oblasti; nasprotno se je vojska v Egiptu, s ciljem da ohrani svojo moč v politiki in ekonomiji, 
postavila v bran avtoritarizma. Povdariti je treba še vpliv tujih držav, ki so vojski omogočile 
dodatno moč v konceptu pretorijanizma. 
Politične stranke so na prvi pogled videti iste a se po podrobnejši raziskavi opazi razlika. Obe 
stranki, tako Muslimanska bratovščina v Egiptu kot Enahda v Tuniziji, imata korenine v 
islamizmu, vendar sta imeli zelo različen vpliv na dogodke, ker je vsaka od njih k situaciji v 
deželi pristopila drugače in je bil zato tudi rezultat bistveno drugačen. 
 
Hipoteze 
Prva hipoteza: Vojska je odigrala odločilno vlogo. Njena bistveno drugačna reakcija v Tuniziji 
kot v Egiptu, skozi ideologijo vojske in s pomočjo, ki jo je vojska dobila od zunaj, je omogočila 
eni državi prehod v demokracijo in ga drugi preprečila. 
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Druga hipoteza: Islamske stranke, ki so dobile politično moč v obeh državah so s svojim 
vplivom pripeljale Tunizijo na obalo demokracije, Egipt pa je bil vržen nazaj v temo vojaškega 
režima in diktaturo. 
 
Raziskovalna metoda 
Metoda raziskave je kvalitativen in globinski pristop zaradi malega števila raziskovanih 
vzorcev (Egipt in Tunizija). Vsak primer bo najprej posebej in podrobno preučen. Sledi 




Vojska je imela v Egiptu odločilno vlogo in je povzročila prevlado diktature in avtoritarizma. 
Zaščitila je svoje ekonomske interese, ker bi v primeru prevlade demokracije, vojska izgubila 
svoje privilegije. Tudi regijske in ostale mednarodne sile so bile v svojem interesu bolj 
naklonjene avtokratskemu režimu. Zato je vojska desetletja dobivala finančno pomoč in je bila 
ta pomoč celo povečana v interesu da vojska ohrani svojo moč. Tako se je končala pot proti 
demokraciji, ki jo je želela doseči Revolucija Jeze. 
Islamska organizacija Muslimanska bratovščina je prišla na oblast po revoluciji v Egiptu, da 
povrne stabilnost in ustvari demokracijo. Stranka je s svojo ideologijo sledila svojim interesom 
in širjenju islama. Pomanjkanje političnih izkušenj in neoziranje na to, da mora delati v korist 
cele egiptovske nacije, je imelo porazen efekt na politično ozračje in povzročilo vrnitev 
avtoritarnega režima. 
V nasprotju z Egiptom je bila vojska v Tuniziji glavni činitelj, ki je odprl možnost 
demokratizacije. Vojska Tunizije ni imela skritih interesov in ekonomskih privilegijev, ki bi jih 
izgubila ob spremembi režima. Ni imela avtonomije pri odločanju in predhodni predsedniki so 
vedno omejevali njeno moč. Sposobna se je bila poistovetiti z revolucijo naroda in ostala je 
profesionalna ter ni po vstaji prevzela nadzora nad ekonomijo. Tudi zahodne sile so potrebovale 
stabilno Tunizijo, kot bazo iz katere vodijo svoje delovanje v severni Afriki.  
Glavna islamska stranka Enahda je tudi skušala služiti pričakovanjem ljudi. Podpirala je 
sekularizacijo in ohranjala dialog z opozicijo ob pojavu problemov ter odklanjala nasilje. 
71 
 
Deželo je izročila novi vladi z upanjem, da bo ta izpolnila pričakovanja ljudi. Tako je tudi 
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